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THREE ESSAYS ON DIVIDEND POLICY 
Mehmet Deren Caliskan 
Old Dominion University, 2015 
Advisor: Dr. John A. Doukas 
 
This dissertation considers paying earnings out as dividends a conservative policy as opposed 
to investing earnings in to value-increasing projects. Based on this view, this dissertation 
explores the effect of chief executive officers’ (CEO) risk preferences on dividend policy, 
market’s reaction to dividend policy changes, and the effect of dividend policy on firm 
financial distress. The first chapter hypothesizes that risk seeking CEOs will be less likely to 
pay dividends compared to conservative CEOs. The second chapter hypothesizes that when 
the market sentiment is high (i.e., when investors are willing to take risk) firms that omit 
dividends should outperform the firms that initiate dividends.  The third chapter predicts 
non-dividend-paying firms to be more likely to be in financial distress compared to dividend 
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CHAPTER 1: CEO RISK PREFERENCES AND DIVIDEND 
POLICY DECISIONS 
1.1 Introduction 
In this study, we examine whether the risk preferences of chief executive officers (CEOs) are 
linked to dividend policy, since they can affect the riskiness of corporate policies.
1
 Using 
inside debt (i.e., pensions and deferred compensation) and the sensitivity of CEO equity 
compensation to stock price (i.e., delta) as proxies of CEO risk aversion, we examine whether 
risk aversion-inducing CEO compensation motivates managers to pay more dividends 
regardless of the market’s preferences (Core and Guay, 1999; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Sundaram and Yermack, 2007). This is likely for two reasons. First, we consider higher 
payouts a conservative policy as opposed to investing in value-increasing projects (Deangelo, 
Deangelo, and Stulz, 2006; Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan, 2002) which involve risk-
taking. Therefore, CEOs with high inside debt should be inclined to pay excess cash out as 
dividends (or buy back stocks) rather than investing in projects, which may increase firm risk 
and thus endanger the value of their inside debt
2
. Second, to pursue investment opportunities 
(i.e., gambles), high-delta CEOs must give up more certain gains, decreasing the utility that 
they derive from investment opportunities (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). On the other 
hand, equity compensation that is sensitive to stock return volatility (i.e., convex 
compensation or high vega) encourages CEOs to invest in value-increasing projects (Core 
                                                 
1
 See Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003) for a comprehensive survey of CEO compensation. 
2
 CEOs may also hold cash; however, due to investor activism and rights, there is a limit to it. Another concern 
may be that since CEOs with high inside debt act like creditors, they may be unwilling to pay dividends due to 





and Guay, 1999). We expect CEOs with convex compensation to decrease payouts since 
they are more likely to invest firm resources in value-increasing projects. 
However, Sundaram and Yermack (2007) postulate that CEOs with more inside debt 
may tend to decrease dividend payouts to shareholders. Providing empirical support for this 
concept, White (2012, p. 2) argues that CEOs with high inside debt “seek to reinvest firm 
income to preserve the long–term viability of the firm and their future pension benefits.” 
Conflicting views about the riskiness of dividend-paying firms exist even outside the academic 
world.
 3
 We contribute to this line of the literature by examining the effect of CEO risk 
preferences on payout policy. In particular, we account for CEOs’ deferred compensation 
(a major component of inside debt) and test the effect of inside debt on the propensity to 
pay, which are overlooked in previous literature (White, 2012). 
Because inside debt data are available since 2006, we test our hypotheses in the 
period from 2006 through 2011, with more than 2000 firm–year observations. We estimate 
the effect of CEO risk preferences on the propensity to pay dividends via logistic regressions. 
Each regression accounts for industry and year fixed effects. Lending support to our 
hypotheses, we find that CEOs with high inside debt or delta (i.e., CEOs with lower risk 
                                                 
3
 For example, the article entitled “Dividend–Paying Stocks Are Not ‘Bond Equivalents’” by the Financial 
Lexicon on Seeking Alpha addresses the general perception that dividend-paying firms are being compared to 
bonds due to their low risk (see http://seekingalpha.com/article/1132851-dividend-paying-stocks-are-not-bond-
equivalents). Even though the article does not present a counterargument to the general perception regarding 
the low risk of dividend-paying firms, it considers the comparison of dividend-paying firms to bonds an 
exaggeration. Another article published on forbes.com, titled “Paying Dividends,” presents a life cycle-oriented 
argument and highlights the idea that dividends are reliable cash flows (see 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/larahoffmans/2012/12/06/paying-dividends-ken-fisher). The article adds, however, 
that a “dividend doesn’t signal sure safety.” Finally, a very interesting proposition is seen on cnbc.com in the 
article “6 Climbing High-Yield Dividend-Paying Stocks,” which presents a completely different perspective to 
the already puzzling story of dividends (see http://www.cnbc.com/id/100331092): The author argues that 
“dividend–paying company executives understand they must stay aggressive each quarter or risk being forced 
to cut the dividend (and upset investors),” which is completely contrary to the public belief of dividend-paying 





tolerance) have a higher propensity to pay dividends, whereas CEOs with high vega (i.e., 
CEOs with high risk tolerance) have a lower propensity to pay dividends.  
Our findings are robust to a battery of additional tests. First, we examine whether the 
relationship between inside-debt and the propensity to pay dividends is non-linear. This is 
because the wealth transfer view suggests that creditors dislike dividends, which may drain 
firm liquidity. If so, managers with significantly high inside debt may be reluctant to pay 
dividends since CEOs with inside debt might act like creditors. As such, the relationship 
between inside debt and the propensity to pay dividends may be non-linear. We test this 
possibility using dummy variables capturing the level of CEOs’ inside debt (i.e., low, mid, 
and high) and comparing the dividend policy decisions of CEOs with low inside debt with 
that of others. Our results indicate that when CEO inside debt is measured via CEO relative 
leverage, there is no evidence of non-linearity. This suggests that CEOs whose personal 
leverage is comparable to that of the firm are more likely to pay dividends, regardless of firm 
characteristics or other CEO compensation incentives. 
In the second robustness test, we check whether our results are sensitive to 
endogeneity bias. Our main concern is that some firm characteristics may be among the 
determinants of CEO compensation, causing an endogeneity bias in our results (Core and 
Guay, 1999). To address this, we deconstruct CEO risk preference proxies into “expected” 
and “excess.” Following Shen and Zhang (2012), we first run a set of ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions, where the dependent variables are CEO variables (e.g., inside debt, vega, 
delta, equity) and the independent variables are firm variables (e.g., the debt/equity ratio, the 
market/book ratio). We save the residuals of these regressions as excess CEO variables that 





preference variables, we replicate the entire logistic regression analysis, which (at least 
partially) allows the endogeneity problem to be resolved. Even though the endogeneity 
robust results are less significant, there is still evidence to support our hypotheses. 
Our third robustness check follows Grullon, Paye, Underwood, and Weston (2011) 
who introduce alternative definitions of payouts. Because firms can pay dividends and issue 
equity at the same time, or buy back shares instead of paying dividends, these authors argue 
that, for unbiased results, it is necessary to examine net payouts (e.g., dividends minus equity 
issuance) as opposed to whether a firm pays cash dividends at time t. Based on Grullon et 
al. (2011), we construct three alternative dependent variables capturing whether the firm’s 
net payouts to shareholders are positive. Even with the alternative definitions of payouts that 
incorporate stock buybacks or the change in the value of treasury stock, our results still 
support the central hypothesis of our paper: risk-averse CEOs are more likely to pass 
earnings to shareholders via cash dividends or stock buybacks, whereas risk-seeking CEOs 
are more likely to retain earnings or issue more equity. 
In our fourth robustness test, we examine the effect of CEO risk preferences on 
dividend policy changes such as dividend initiations, omissions, etc. This is because our main 
analysis may be biased, as some firms may have started or stopped paying dividends before 
the CEO took office. If so, examining dividend policy changes (e.g., initiations, omissions, 
etc.) should ensure that the dividend policy is affected by the current CEO’s risk preferences, 
and thus alleviate a possible endogeneity problem. Consistent with our prior findings, we 
find that conservative CEOs are more likely to initiate or increase dividends, whereas risk-





In the fifth robustness tests, we replicate our original analysis in the period from 1995 
through 2008. The advantage of this analysis is that it includes 2.5 times more observations 
than our original dataset. Further, it excludes the post-financial crisis era, which could have 
caused a bias in our prior results due to the pessimistic environment. Most importantly, this 
dataset allows us to test our hypothesis in a period that is mostly characterized by high 
sentiment because according to catering theory, market sentiment (measured by the average 
market/book ratio difference between payers and non-payers) determines the propensity to 
pay dividends. Thus our findings may be sample-specific due to market conditions. In this 
analysis, we find that CEOs with high delta or non-convex equity compensations have a 
higher propensity to pay dividends than CEOs with convex equity compensations. Hence, 
our results alleviate some of the sensitivity concerns with respect to the selection of a specific 
sample period.  
In our sixth and final robustness test, we examine whether our findings are robust to 
market conditions in a more direct way. To do so, in the spirit of Baker and Wurgler (2004), 
we introduce the Relative Dividend Premium (RDP) measure to our analysis; RDP is the 
average market-to-book ratio of dividend paying firms minus that of firm i.
4
 According to the 
catering theory, when the RDP is high (i.e., when dividend paying firms trade at a premium 
relative to firm i ), managers should be likely to pay dividends. Testing this prediction, we 
estimate our baseline logistic regression with the inclusion of the RDP. The purpose of this 
test is to investigate whether our findings still hold after controlling for the market’s 
preference for dividends. The results of this analysis show that risk-seeking CEOs are less 
                                                 
4
 Note that the RDP is derived based on the Dividend Premium of Baker and Wurgler (2004), defined as the 





likely to pay dividends and conservative CEOs are more likely to pay dividends, regardless 
of the market’s state of preference for dividends.  
In sum, testing the link between CEO risk preferences and payout policy, we find 
that risk-averse CEOs have a higher propensity to pay dividends than risk-seeking CEOs do. 
In particular, CEOs may forgo investment opportunities and pay out more dividends when 
they have greater exposure to inside debt. This pattern is also true for CEOs with less convex 
compensation packages. Perhaps this type of compensation motivates CEOs to maximize 
their utility rather than their wealth, since the utility that people derive from dividends and 
capital gains is different (Baker, Nagel, and Wurgler, 2007; Shefrin and Statman, 1984; 
Shefrin and Thaler, 1988). Especially after the 2008 financial crisis, we expect shareholders 
to “care” more about dividends and to compensate CEOs with instruments ensuring higher 
payouts. Our results show that debt-like compensation could prevent excessive risk taking 
and could increase dividend payouts. 
The rest of this study is organized as follows. The next section presents a literature 
review on dividend policy, conflicts of interest between different parties in firms, and the 
antecedents and consequences of CEO risk tolerance. Section 2 develops a testable 
hypothesis and discusses the possible effects of CEO risk preferences on dividend policy. 
Section 3 presents the results of our empirical analysis and robustness checks. Section 4 





1.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
1.2.1 Dividends and firm risk 
Our goal is to investigate whether CEO risk preferences affect payout policy. 
Although Miller and Modigliani (1961) argue that dividend policy is irrelevant, some 
investors demand dividends for certainty
5
 (Graham and Dodd, 1951), since managers may 
retain earnings to invest in risky projects. For instance, Fama and French (2001) show a trade-
off between dividends and investments, Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) 
document that firm risk decreases after dividend increases (see also DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 2006; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz, 2006), and Hoberg and Prabhala (2006) 
show that risky firms decrease dividends. In a different strand, Redding (1998) reveals a 
positive relation between the demand for dividends and investor risk aversion. Confirming 
Redding (1998), Breuer, Rieger, and Soypak (2012) show that, in countries where investors 
are more impatient and loss averse, firms pay out more dividends. Findings from both the 
firm side and the investor side suggest that paying dividends is a more conservative policy, 
since the alternative scenario may be to invest in high-risk projects. Therefore, this leads to 
the prediction that risk-averse CEOs (e.g., CEOs with high inside debt or delta) are more 
likely to pay dividends. 
The catering theory of dividends, however, asserts that the disappearance of 
dividends since the 1960s (Fama and French, 2001) is due to the market being populated by 
investors with higher sentiment, leading to a higher demand for capital gains over dividends. 
Baker and Wurgler (2004) argue that managers cater to this investor demand by investing in 
value-increasing projects as opposed to paying dividends. In this study, we propose that if a 
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CEO is risk-averse, the CEO could pass on risky projects and pay out dividends, even when 
the market demands capital gains. This is because risky projects lead to higher stock return 
volatility; in efficient markets investors put a discount on risky firms’ shares, which increases 
the firm’s market leverage. Lower share price, higher leverage, and increased volatility 
obstructs managers’ ability to raise external capital in both equity and debt markets. These 
not only increase the cost of capital, but may also cause financial distress.  
Therefore, using alternative measures of risk aversion, we investigate whether firms 
that are run by risk-averse CEOs are more likely to pay dividends even during periods of 
high investor sentiment. This could explain why some firms still pay dividends during low-
dividend premium periods (i.e., when the market prefers capital gains over dividends). Since 
managers may disburse cash not only by paying dividends, but also by stock buybacks, our 
empirical approach considers the effect of dividend payouts and net payouts in the spirit of 
Grullon et al. (2011). That is, we examine conservative CEOs’ propensity to pay out 
dividends and the propensity to have a positive net payout (which is calculated as the value 
of the stocks that are bought back plus the value of dividends paid, less the value of equity 
issuances).   
1.2.2 CEO conservatism and cash holdings 
While we test whether firms run by conservative CEOs are more likely to pay 
dividends, one may also argue that conservative CEOs may accumulate cash as a cushion in 
case of an emergency. Having such a cushion increases the firm’s financial strength and 
decreases the likelihood of bankruptcy, which is the goal of conservative CEOs. However, 
this view is sound only when there are no agency costs and investors hold an optimal 





several reasons. First, when a firm accumulates a great deal of cash, shareholders may 
become irritated, as managers may pursue their empire building objectives using free cash 
flow (Jensen, 1986). Another reason investors may be concerned is because when CEOs do 
not invest cash flows in projects to increase returns, shareholders bear an opportunity cost 
due to forgone investment projects. When managers disburse cash, investors can not only 
re-invest their proceeds based on their risk-return preferences, but also allocate their wealth 
in other assets to prevent under-diversification. Because of these reasons, if managers hoard 
a large sum of cash, they may face pressure from activist investors, especially in countries 
where investor rights are protected. Since our sample is from the U.S. where investor right-
protection is the highest, the CEOs in our sample are more likely to be subject to greater 
investor activism and, thus, less likely to hoard cash flows.
6
 This leaves CEOs with two 
options: investing in new projects or distributing earnings to shareholders. In the context of 
our study, since excess cash must be disgorged, we predict conservative CEOs to be more 
likely to pay dividends because they are less prone to invest cash flow in risky projects or 
prefer protecting their job by not falling into conflict with activist investors by hoarding cash 
flows.
7
 Conversely, we predict risk-seeking CEOs to be less eager to pay dividends as they 
pursue new projects in an attempt to increase firm value.  
                                                 
6
A good example is Apple Inc. In 2012, Apple had to pay more than $2 per share as dividends due to investor 
demand, solely because Apple accumulated excess free cash and in 2014 Apple dispersed 11.1 billion in 
dividends. While Apple is one of the most established and well-managed firms in the world, it was forced to 
disgorge surplus cash to its shareholders. Apple’s CEO Tim Cook decided to pay dividends as opposed to 
launching their own satellites (URL: http://seekingalpha.com/article/316669-putting-a-satellite-into-orbit-a-
great-use-for-aapls-cash).  
7
During the 2013-14 period, Apple is forced to increase dividend payouts and repurchase 45 billion worth of 
shares instead of investing, due to the pressure from Carl Icahn – a major blockholder. In 2015, Carl Icahn 
urged Apple to increase its share-buyback program, and Apple announced a $50 billion increase in its share-








Starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976), many studies show that the method of 
compensation affects CEO behavior and thus corporate policies. Consequently, we use the 
nature of managerial compensation to proxy for CEO risk preferences. 
1.2.3 Inside debt 
Among the methods of CEO compensation, inside debt ties the value of CEO wealth 
to the market value of debt, which is inversely related to firm risk (e.g., Edmans and Liu, 
2011; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007). Put differently, inside 
debt turns the CEO into a creditor who is not better off with higher share prices but faces a 
significant cost with bankruptcy. Therefore, inside debt is believed to discourage excessive 
risk taking and, in turn, forcing CEOs to allocate firm resources conservatively to increase 
the distance to default (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007). It also restrains CEOs from 
leveraging the firm and increasing research and development (R&D) expenditures, but 
motivates operational hedging (Cassell et al., 2012). Consistent with these findings, we predict 
high inside debt will lead to a high propensity to pay dividends, which we consider a 
conservative policy. However, Chen, Dou, and Wang (2011) and Sundaram and Yermack 
(2007) conjecture that dividends are a threat against companies’ future financial health and 
hypothesize that CEOs with high inside debt will decrease payouts. Using hand-collected 
data, White (2012) shows that CEOs with high pensions decrease payout ratios and dividend 
yields. However, White’s study has a number of limitations. First, White’s hand–collected 
dataset is limited to pension-based compensation, as opposed to a combination of deferred 
compensation and pension. Second, White’s dataset has 1507 firm–year observations from 







 from 2006 through 2011. Hence, his findings may be sample-specific. Most 
importantly, he does not analyze the effect of inside debt compensation on the propensity to 
pay dividends, dividend initiations, or net payouts, which are addressed in the current study. 
In sum, unlike our hypothesis, this strand of literature suggests that paying dividends 
may reduce cash reserves, which might be considered as a wealth transfer from creditors to 
shareholders. However, the traditional wealth transfer hypothesis may not be applicable to 
CEOs with high inside debt because, even though CEOs with high inside debt may act like 
creditors, they are not pure creditors; they are hybrid stakeholders since, in addition to being 
a creditor due to inside debt, they are also shareholders of their own firm. In other words, 
when a CEO with high inside debt pays dividends, s/he is among the recipients of the 
dividend proceeds.  
Even so, one may still argue that CEOs with high inside debt may build up slack cash 
instead of paying dividends. However, as we argued in subsection 2.2, there is a limit to 
hoarding cash due to investor activism and investor rights protection considerations.  Hence, 
profits, at some point, need to be invested in projects or distributed to shareholders. Investing 
in new projects may increase stock return and cash flow volatilities, which may cause the 
market to perceive the firm risky. This, in turn, may hamper a firm’s ability to raise external 
capital in the future and may lead to a financial distress, especially when closer to debt 
maturity dates. In short, we argue that, risk-averse CEOs are expected to be less likely to bear 
such a risk. Hence, the remaining possibility for CEOs is either paying out dividends or 
buying back stocks. While paying dividends may reduce firm liquidity, it allows firms to 
access more external equity since mutual funds only invest in firms that pay dividends. Paying 
                                                 
8





dividends or buying back stocks also help the firm in the equity markets. Stock buybacks 
and, according to the signaling view, paying dividends increase the share price; therefore, if 
needed, the firm may issue shares at a higher price and increase firm liquidity. Moreover, 
the literature shows that creditors are not necessarily alarmed by dividend payouts. This is 
because firms usually pay less than what the debt covenants allows (Kalay, 1982); based on 
the signaling view, Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) document that creditors may consider 
dividend payouts as “good news” regarding the future profitability of the firm and not tighten 
the lending terms.   
1.2.4 CEO equity compensation 
Unlike inside debt, equity compensation compels managers to work in the best 
interest of shareholders by increasing equity value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, 
equity compensation may substitute for dividends for two reasons. First, CEOs with equity 
compensation should seek investment projects more aggressively. Second, shareholders 
should demand fewer dividends, since they will be less concerned about wasting firm 
resources (Jensen, 1986).
9
 However, high equity compensation can also induce risk aversion, 
restraining managers from pursuing value-increasing projects. First, higher CEO 
shareholding causes CEOs to incur large losses subsequent to drops in share value (Lambert 
et al., 1991; Smith and Stulz, 1985). This is mainly due to managerial underdiversification, 
since CEO intellectual capital is already invested in the firm. A possible financial distress 
threatens not only CEO equity holding, but also CEO lifetime annuities and reputation 
(Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991). Lending support to this, Tufano (1996) shows a 
                                                 
9
 Our hypothesis is also in line with other views. First, Rozeff (1982) argues that CEOs with higher equity 
compensation also receive higher dividends, creating high tax penalties for CEOs. Second, Deshmukh, Goel, 






positive relation between CEO ownership and hedging activities. The second reason equity 
compensation could substitute for dividends is because capital gains (i.e., gambles) and 
dividends (i.e., certain gains) yield different utility (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and 
CEOs could act as if they were maximizing the total utility they derive from them (Baker, 
Nagel, and Wurgler, 2007; Shefrin and Statman, 1984; Shefrin and Thaler, 1988). This 
suggests that, even though CEOs’ goal is to maximize equity value, they may pass on 
investment opportunities when the marginal cost of pursuing projects (i.e., forgone 
dividends) is high. Since CEOs with high shareholding have to sacrifice more dividends when 
they take on investment projects, they may forgo investment opportunities leading to high 
payouts. 
1.2.5 CEO equity delta and vega 
Core and Guay (2002) and Guay (1999) show that the effects of CEO equity 
compensation on the riskiness of corporate policies depends not only on the size of the CEO 
equity compensation, but also on its sensitivity to stock returns and the stock return volatility 
(delta and vega, respectively). Core and Guay show that high delta leads to more conservative 
policies, while high vega increases CEO risk tolerance, since it raises the convexity of the 
compensation package. For instance, CEOs with high delta tend to hedge more (Knopf, 
Nam, and Thornton, 2002) and decrease R&D and leverage (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 
2006). On the other hand, CEOs with high vega have a tendency to increase leverage and 
diversify less (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; Low, 2009; 





to have a higher (lower) propensity to pay dividends, since we consider paying out dividends 
a conservative policy compared to investing in value-increasing projects.
10
 
While the effect of delta and inside debt on CEO risk preferences and thus dividend 
policy may seem similar, the channels through which they affect dividend policy are indeed 
different: High CEO delta encourages CEOs to pursue less risky strategies because CEOs 
with high delta faces managerial underdiversification (i.e., CEOs’ human capital and stock-
based compensation are tied to the firm’s fortunes). Hence, the effect of a drop in stock price 
on CEO’s wealth is immediate for CEOs with high delta.  
On the other hand, increased firm risk affects the wealth of CEOs with high inside 
debt if the firm faces bankruptcy. One must note that, when stock price goes down, CEOs 
with high delta face losses; however, they still have an opportunity to recover losses by making 
better investment decisions and thus increasing the share price. Conversely, once the firm 
goes bankrupt, inside debt is mostly uncollectable. Thus, inside debt has a long-term effect 
on CEOs and can lead to a stronger form of risk-aversion because, unlike the value of high 
delta equity compensation, that of inside debt does not increase when the stock price 
increases. In other words, CEOs with high inside debt may pass on investments and 
distribute cash even if the investment project is low risk.  
Using both measures, we are interested in knowing if delta and inside debt yield a 
consistent relationship with firm’s dividend policy. 
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 Following the prior literature, we scale delta by vega to derive a less noisy variable in our empirical analysis 





1.2.6 Cash compensation: Salaries and bonuses 
In Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) framework, cash compensation (salaries and bonuses) 
does not motivate CEOs to invest in long–term value-increasing projects because salaries are 
not sensitive to firm performance. Even though bonuses are granted depending on the 
CEO’s success in a certain goal, they are generally short-term performance based 
compensation arrangements (Berger, Ofek, and Yermack, 1997; Lewellen, Loderer, and 
Martin, 1987). In other words, since cash compensation (the sum of salaries and bonuses) 
does not motivate CEOs to increase firm value in the long run, we do not anticipate CEOs 
with high cash compensation to invest in value-increasing projects. This may imply higher 
payouts; however, cash compensation may also cause CEOs to abuse free cash flows (Jensen, 
1986). Therefore, the effect of cash compensation on the propensity to pay could be positive 
or negative. 
1.2.7 CEO age and tenure 
 Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) find that younger CEOs value their compensation 
incentives more than older CEOs do, implying that they may be more motivated to seek risk 
to increase equity value and, as a result, their compensation. Consistent with this, Serfling 
(2013) presents a wide-range analysis on how corporate policies are affected by CEO age and 
shows that younger CEOs increase firm risk. 
Further, CEO tenure is generally used as a control variable to proxy for managerial 
entrenchment (e.g., Berger, Ofek, and Yermack, 1997) or risk aversion (e.g., Coles, Daniel, 
and Naveen, 2006), both of which indicate that CEOs with longer tenure are less likely to 
increase firm value. We therefore expect older CEOs and CEOs with longer tenure to pay 





1.3 Empirical analysis 
1.3.1 Data and methodology 
Since the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s 2006 rule, managers’ deferred 
compensation and pension data, in addition to the detailed information of each stock option 
tranche (i.e., expiration date, number of stock options, and exercise price of each option 
grant), are available in Standard & Poor’s Execucomp data. The detailed stock option data 
allow using the full information method rather than the one–year approximation method of 
Core and Guay (2002) in the calculation of stock option valuation.
11
 Hence, the dataset used 
in this study consists of observations from 2006 through 2011.
12
 In addition to Execucomp, 
the data are collected from Standard & Poor’s Compustat, the Center of Research in Security 
Prices, and Kenneth French’s website.
13
 Finally, the three-month Treasury bill rate is 
obtained from the Federal Reserve’s website.
14,15
 We filter the dataset such that all 
observations have full disclosure of the CEO stock options available in Execucomp and we 
omit utilities and financial firms. Table 1 presents the distribution of the data by year.  
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 Core and Guay (2002) use the last available year’s data to estimate the total value and the sensitivities of all 
the outstanding stock options, rather than track each tranche over time. In particular, they assume that the 
tranche that is granted in the last available year has 10 years to maturity, while all the other tranches have seven 
and a half years to maturity. In addition, dividing the total value of all outstanding options by the number of 
options outstanding, the authors approximate how much each option is in the money. By subtracting this 
amount from the price of the underlying stock, they find the exercise price. 
12
 In the robustness checks, we also use data from 1995 through 2008.  
13
 See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
14
 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm. 
15
 Even though the analysis includes observations from 2006 to 2011, observations from 2005 are used to 
calculate the change in total assets. Additionally, since stock return volatility is calculated using stock prices over 





1.3.2 Measures of CEO risk preference 
1.3.2.1 CEO compensation and risk preferences 
Many studies in the literature use CEO equity compensation, CEO delta and vega, 
and CEO inside debt to proxy for CEO risk preferences. Prior findings indicate that CEO 
delta (or the CEO delta/vega ratio) and CEO inside debt decrease CEO risk tolerance and 
compel managers to employ low-risk corporate policies. On the other hand, convex CEO 
equity compensation incentivizes CEOs to pursue risky projects. Below, we discuss the 
variables we derive following prior studies. 
1.3.2.2 Inside debt 
We proxy for CEO inside debt with three variables (e.g., Cassell et al., 2012; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007): First, we calculate inside debt as the 
total dollar value of CEO pension and deferred compensation. Second, we derive CEO 
Relative Leverage as CEO leverage (CEO inside debt divided by total CEO equity 
compensation) over firm leverage. In our regression analysis, we use the natural logarithm of 
this variable for less noisy results. Finally, we derive a dummy variable indicating that CEO 
leverage is higher than firm leverage (i.e., a binary variable that equals one if CEO leverage 
is above firm leverage and zero otherwise). In our multivariate analysis, we refer to this 
variable as High CEO Relative Leverage. Following the prior literature, we predict high 
inside debt and High CEO Relative Leverage will discourage risky projects leading to higher 
payouts. 
1.3.2.3 CEO equity compensation 
We calculate CEO Equity as the total dollar value of CEO common stocks, stock 





option pricing model (see Black and Scholes, 1973). CEOs can have up to 10 stock option 
tranches, since each tranche matures in 10 years. All of these data are available since 2006 
in Execucomp, allowing us to calculate the stock option value of each tranche using the full 
information method, as opposed to the approximation method of Core and Guay (2002). 
We find the value of CEO stock option portfolios by aggregating those of each tranche. See 
Appendix 2 for a detailed derivation of these variables. 
1.3.2.4 CEO equity delta and vega 
We first calculate the delta and vega (sensitivity to stock price and sensitivity to stock 
return volatility, respectively) of each stock option tranche by taking the partial derivative of 
the Black–Scholes option pricing formula with respect to the stock price and the stock return 
volatility, respectively. Aggregating each tranche’s delta and vega, we find the CEOs’ stock 
option portfolio delta and vega, respectively. Following Core and Guay (2002), it is assumed 
that the delta and vega of CEO equity are the numbers of CEO shares multiplied by 1.0 and 
0.01, respectively. This is because delta and vega are the CEO equity’s sensitivity to a $1 
change in the stock price and a 1% change in the stock return volatility, respectively. See 
Appendix 2 for detailed derivations of these variables. 
1.3.2.5 Other variables 
In addition to the above variables, we derive CEO Cash Compensation as the sum 
of CEO salary and bonuses. Since cash compensation does not motivate CEOs to enhance 
long-term firm performance and could cause managers to abuse firm resources, cash 
compensation could have a significant effect on payout policy. We also use CEO Age and 
CEO Tenure as control variables, since older CEOs and CEOs with longer tenure tend to 





We define a firm dividend payer when its dividend per share by exdate is greater 
than zero. For more robustness, we use three dummy variables following Grullon et al. 
(2011) to define a firm a payer. The first variable is set to one if the value of total dividend 
payouts is greater than the value of stocks that are bought; otherwise, the variable is set to 
zero.  The second one is set to one if the value of total dividend payouts plus the change in 
the value of treasury stock is positive, and zero otherwise. When the change in the value of 
treasury stock is missing, we replaced it with Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock less 
Sale of Common and Preferred Stock. The last dummy variable is set to one if the value of 
Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock less Sale of Common and Preferred Stock is 
positive, and zero otherwise.  
We also use a variety of firm-level control variables. To proxy for growth 
opportunities, we derive the Market/Book Ratio, Change in Assets, the capital expenditures 
to total assets ratio (Capex/Total Assets Ratio), the ratio of R&D expenditures to assets 
(R&D/Total Assets Ratio), Return Volatility, and the ratio of retained earnings to assets 
(Retained Earnings/Total Assets). We proxy firm size, by the percentage of firms that are 
smaller than the firm in a given year and profitability with earnings available to common stock 
holders. In the robustness tests, we use debt/equity ratio to proxy for leverage, cash flows 
from operations less total dividends to proxy for free cash flows, and the natural log of sales 
to proxy for firm size. Following Baker and Wurgler (2004), we use the Relative Dividend 
Premium, which is the average market-to-book ratio of dividend paying firms at time t less 
the market-to-book ratio of firm i at time t. Finally, we measure firm idiosyncratic risk with 
the standard deviation of 36 monthly excess returns, estimated as the error term of the 





1.3.2.6 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 Part A presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables for dividend-
paying and non-paying firms in the period of 2006 through 2011. We hypothesize risk-averse 
CEOs pay out more dividends than risk-seeking CEOs. Namely, CEOs with more inside 
debt, higher relative leverage, higher delta, and lower vega are expected to have a higher 
propensity to pay dividends. Descriptive statistics show that, in dividend-paying firms, CEOs 
have higher inside debt than CEOs in non-paying firms ($1.495 million compared to $0.559 
million) and the natural logarithm of their relative leverage is higher than that of their non-
paying counterparts (–0.587 compared to –1.588). They have less equity holdings in the firm 
($20.923 million compared to $25.854 million), the delta/vega ratio of their equity 
compensation is larger (57.314 compared to 8.753), and their equity compensations are less 
sensitive to stock return volatilities (i.e., their vega is lower: $9.807 and compared to 
$59.477). Finally, CEOs in dividend-paying firms are older (the mean age in the subsample 
of payers is 55.572 years compared to 54.311 years) and they have longer tenure (the mean 
number of consecutive years served in the same firm in the subsample of payers is 5.94 year 
compared to 4.966 years).
16
 All these mean-difference findings, shown in Panel C, are 
statistically significant at the 1% level per two-tailed t-tests.   
Regarding firm characteristics, the results are consistent with those of Fama and 
French (2001): Dividend-paying firms are larger, as measured by market equity ($768 million 
compared to $665 million); have fewer growth opportunities, proxied by the change in total 
assets from time t – 1 to time t and the market/book ratio (4.9% compared to 9.1% and 2.025 
compared to 2.152, respectively); and are more profitable than their non–dividend-paying 
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counterparts ($44.019 million compared to $20.765 million). In addition, Capex/Total 
Assets Ratio and R&D/Total Assets Ratio are used as investment opportunity proxies to 
alleviate any omitted variable bias. Both of these variables have higher mean values in the 
subsample in non-paying firms (4.73% compared to 4.79% and 2.29% compared to 6.459%, 
respectively).
17
 In sum, all these findings so far support the view that dividend-paying firms 
are less risky: They are larger, more profitable, have less room to grow, and are managed by 
risk-averse CEOs.  
Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients of the main variables of interest.
18
 In 
accord with our previous discussion, we expect inside debt, CEO relative leverage, the CEO 
Delta/Vega Ratio, CEO Age, and tenure to be positively correlated with Payout Ratio and 
Dividend Yield, as we hypothesize risk-averse CEOs will pay out more dividends. The 
Payout Ratio is positively correlated with CEO Inside Debt at the 5% level and with the CEO 
Delta/Vega Ratio at the 10% level. In addition, it is negatively correlated with the CEO Vega 
at the 10% level.  Dividend Yield is positively correlated with CEO Inside Debt at the 1% 
level. The CEO Delta/Vega Ratio is positively correlated, whereas CEO Vega is negatively 
correlated with dividend yield, both of which are significant at the 1% level. Finally, CEO 
Age and CEO Tenure are positively correlated with both payout ratio and dividend yield. 
While these findings do not indicate causality, they support the hypothesis that risk-seeking 
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The descriptive statistics indicate outlying observations in the dataset, that is, skewness that could cause 
heteroskedasticity, thus deteriorating the validity of the empirical analysis. Hence, we rigorously inspect the 
yearly subsamples for possible violation of homoskedasticity via model specification tests that also test the 
independence of the regressors from the error terms. For more robustness, all t-values of the OLS regressions 
are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
18
 The largest correlation is observed between free cash flows and the market/book ratio (–75%), which are not 
used in the same estimation model throughout the study. The second largest correlation is between CEO age 
and tenure (39%). A possible multicollinearity issue is taken into consideration during the multivariate analysis. 





inducing CEO compensation decreases payout, whereas compensation strategies that 
discourage risk taking increase payout. 
1.3.3 Logistic Regression Analysis: The effect of CEO risk tolerance on the propensity to 
pay dividends 
The empirical goal of this study is to examine the effect of CEO risk preferences 
(proxied by CEO inside debt, vega, delta, etc.) on dividend policy. Prior literature suggests 
that inside debt and high delta compel managers to employ low-risk corporate policies, 
whereas high vega encourages risk-seeking behavior. Since we consider paying out dividends 
to be a conservative policy, we expect CEOs with high inside debt or high delta to have a 
higher propensity to pay dividends compared to CEOs with high vega. To test our 
hypothesis, we run logistic regressions in which the dependent variable equals one if the firm 
pays dividends at time t, and zero otherwise. 
Table 4 presents the results of the logistic regressions. In the first seven models, we 
examine the effect of each CEO risk preference variable separately. For robustness, we proxy 
for inside debt using three variables (i.e., the sum of CEO deferred compensation and 
pensions, CEO relative leverage, and a dummy variable indicating that CEO leverage is 
higher than that of the firm), since these variables are used interchangeably in the literature. 
We run three more models (models (8) through (10)) to estimate the propensity to pay 
dividends using all the CEO variables since we proxy for inside debt using three variables. 
We estimate all models using CEO- and firm-level control variables, as well as with industry 
and year dummies. All the coefficients in this table are log odds ratios and transformed to 
probability with the natural exponential function, i.e., 𝑒𝑐 where 𝑒 is the mathematical 





unit change in any coefficient on the propensity to pay dividends is calculated as follows: 
(𝑒𝑐 − 1) × 100.  
The first model shows that CEO cash compensation has no significant effect on the 
propensity to pay dividends. In models (2) through (4), we find that all three inside debt 
proxies positively affect the propensity to pay dividends at the 1% level, supporting our 
hypothesis that risk aversion-inducing compensation increases payouts. In economic terms, 
since the coefficients of CEO Inside Debt and Log CEO Relative Leverage are 0.0698 and 
0.2238, the results indicate that a $1 million increase in inside debt or a 1% increase in CEO 
relative leverage increases the chances of paying out dividends by 7.2% and 25%, 
respectively.
19
 More strikingly, the coefficient of High CEO Relative Leverage is 1.19 
indicating that CEOs whose personal leverage is above the firm’s leverage are 2.31 times 
more likely to pay dividends compared to other CEOs. 
20
 
Analyzing the effect of equity compensation and the convexity of equity 
compensation on the propensity to pay, we find more supporting evidence for our hypothesis 
in models (5) through (7). Model (5) shows that a one-point increase in the CEO Delta/Vega 
Ratio increases the propensity to pay dividends by 4.4%.
21
 In models (6) and (7), the 
coefficients CEO Equity and CEO Vega are -0.0056 and -0.0539 suggesting that a $1 million 
increase in equity compensation or a $1000 increase in vega decreases the propensity to pay 
dividends by 0.56% or 5.25%, respectively.
22
 These results indicate that equity compensation 
and, in particular, convex equity CEO compensation decrease payouts. This finding is 
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 (𝑒0.0698 − 1) × 100 = 7.2% and (𝑒0.2238 − 1) × 100 = 25.08% 
20
 (𝑒1.1987 − 1) × 100 = 231.5804% 
21
 (𝑒0.0443 − 1) × 100 = 4.4% 
22





consistent with our argument that CEO compensation that encourages risk taking decreases 
payouts as CEOs invest firm resources in projects.  
In models (8) through (10), Table 4, we examine the effect of CEO variables on the 
propensity to pay dividends when other CEO characteristics are included in these 
regressions. Note that we estimate three models (i.e., models (8) through (10)), since we 
proxy inside debt with three variables. While the magnitudes and significance change, we still 
find that CEO Vega decreases and the CEO Delta/Vega Ratio increases the propensity to 
pay dividends. We also find that when other compensation variables enter the model, the 
coefficient of CEO Equity becomes insignificant. We argue that this is probably due to the 
vega, since it captures the convexity of the compensation package. In other words, rather 
than the size of the CEO Equity, we find that its sensitivity to stock return volatility decreases 
the propensity to pay. Last but not least, in these last three models, two out of three CEO 
inside debt variables have positive coefficients and are significant at the 5% levels. This 
supports our hypothesis that conservative CEOs are more likely to pay dividends. 
This hypothesis is also supported by the control variables showing that CEOs with 
longer tenure have a higher propensity to pay dividends. Further, mature firms (i.e., firms 
with high retained earnings to assets ratio) are more likely to pay dividends compared to 
firms that invest in R&D and increase their assets. All these results are in line with the view 
that there is a trade-off between investments and dividends (Deangelo, Deangelo, and Stulz, 
2006; Fama and French, 2001; Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan, 2002) and with the 






1.3.4 Robustness check: Non-linearity test with inside-debt 
Inside debt makes CEOs behave like creditors and compels them to manage the firm 
conservatively (i.e., prefer less risk to more risk-taking management decisions). The signaling 
view predicts a positive reaction to dividend payouts in bond prices, indicating that creditors 
do not consider dividends an expropriation of creditors in favor of shareholders. The wealth 
transfer view, on the other hand, indicates the opposite; creditors dislike dividends, as they 
may drain firm liquidity. If so, managers with significantly high inside debt may be reluctant 
to pay dividends. That is, the relationship between inside debt and the propensity to pay 
dividends may be non-linear. In order to test this possibility, we develop dummy variables 
capturing the levels of CEO inside debt. Namely these variables are Low, Mid, and High 
Inside Debt, as well as Low, Mid, and High CEO relative leverage. We substitute our original 
inside debt variables with these variables in our empirical analysis to test the possible non-
linearity issue. The results are presented in Table 5. The Low Inside Debt Dummy and Low 
CEO Relative Leverage Dummy variables are not included in the models; therefore, the 
reference group consists of CEOs with low inside debt or low CEO relative leverage. Based 
on the central hypothesis of this paper, the coefficient of the Mid Inside Debt and Mid CEO 
Relative Leverage Dummy should be positive and significant. More important, the 
coefficients of the High Inside Debt Dummy and High CEO Relative Leverage should be 
larger than those of Mid Inside Debt Dummy and High Inside Debt Dummy. However, if 
managers act in accord with the prediction of the wealth transfer hypothesis, the coefficients 
of High Inside Debt Dummy and High CEO Relative Leverage Dummy should be lower 






In Model (1), we find that both the significance and the magnitude of High CEO 
Relative Leverage Dummy are higher than those of Mid CEO Inside Debt Dummy. We 
find the same pattern in Model (2), which is estimated with Mid and High CEO Relative 
Leverage dummies. In this model, the magnitude and the significance of High CEO Relative 
Leverage Dummy is twice as greater compared to those of Mid CEO Relative Leverage. For 
more robustness, we estimate models (3) and (4) by including other CEO risk preference 
variables. In model (3), the significance and the magnitude of High CEO Relative Leverage 
Dummy variable’s coefficient is lower than those of Mid CEO Relative Leverage Dummy. 
While this may be a sign of non-linearity, the results of model (4) show that the CEOs with 
high relative leverage are more likely to pay dividends. Thus, our results indicate that when 
CEO inside debt is measured via CEO relative leverage, there is no evidence of non-linearity; 
this indicates that CEOs whose personal leverage is comparable to that of the firm are more 
likely to pay dividends, regardless of firm characteristics or other CEO compensation 
incentives. 
1.3.5 Robustness check: Addressing endogeneity 
Since boards pay CEOs in ways that align interests between shareholders and CEOs, 
CEO compensation and as a result CEO risk tolerance variables are likely to be determined 
endogenously (Core and Guay, 1999). To examine whether our results are robust to possible 
endogeneity concerns, we employ a rigorous test, following Shen and Zhang (2012). We 
deconstruct CEO risk tolerance variables (e.g., inside debt, delta, vega) into predicted values 
(i.e., predicted via firm characteristics) and excess values to strip away the effect of firm 





independent variables are firm characteristics.
23
 Next, we use the error terms as the excess 
compensation and risk tolerance variables. 
Using these excess compensation and risk tolerance variables as the independent 
variables, we replicate the analysis presented in Table 4. We estimate the effect of the excess 
compensation variables on the propensity to pay and Table 6 presents the results. In the first 
two models, we observe that CEO Excess Cash Compensation and CEO Excess Delta/Vega 
Ratio, do not significantly affect the propensity to pay dividends   In economic terms, in 
contrast with our hypotheses, these findings imply that, rather than CEO compensation or 
risk preferences, firm characteristics play a role in payout policy. However findings in model 
(3) show that CEO Excess Inside Debt increases the propensity to pay and it is significant at 
the 10% level. Further, the results of models (4) and (5) of Table 6 show that CEO Excess 
Equity Compensation and CEO Excess Vega decrease the propensity to pay dividends, both 
of which are at the 1% level. This finding supports our argument that compensation schemes 
which increase CEO risk tolerance lead to lower payouts. Finally, model (6) is estimated 
using all the excess compensation variables. Note that the sign of CEO Excess Equity changes 
while the coefficient of CEO Excess Inside Debt becomes significant at the 5% level. These 
results imply that non-convex equity compensation and inside debt increase the propensity 
to pay dividends, whereas convex compensation, as shown by excess vega, has the opposite 
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 The unreported results of the OLS regressions indicate that CEO age (positive) and firm size (positive) are 
the only variables that affect CEO cash compensation. CEO inside debt holding (the sum of deferred 
compensation and pensions) is affected by firm-specific risk (negative), free cash flows at time t – 1 (negative), 
firm size (positive), and tenure (positive). A CEO’s equity (sum of the value of shares, restricted shares, and 
options) in the firm is a function of cash compensation (positive), leverage (negative), free cash flows at time t 
– 1 (positive), tenure (positive), and the firm’s growth opportunities (positive). The CEO vega is a function of 
cash compensation (positive), leverage (negative), firm size (positive), tenure (positive), and growth 
opportunities (positive). Finally, the CEO delta is affected by cash compensation (positive), leverage (negative), 






effect. Overall, although the endogeneity-robust results are less significant than the original 
analysis reported in Table 4, they concur with the previous findings; this provides additional 
support to our central hypothesis which predicts that risk-averse CEOs are more likely to 
pay dividends than risk-seeking CEOs.
24
 In sum, our evidence so far shows that CEO risk 
preferences play a role in payout policy.  
1.3.6 Robustness check: Alternative measures of payouts  
Our goal is to test whether CEO risk preferences play a role in dividend policy. 
Traditionally, the dividend policy literature considers the firm a dividend payer when the 
firm has a positive dividend per share. However, Grullon et al. (2011) introduce alternative 
definitions of payouts, as firms can pay dividends and issue equity at the same time or buy 
back shares instead of paying dividends. Therefore, these authors argue that, for unbiased 
results, it is necessary to examine net payouts (e.g., dividends minus equity issuance) as 
opposed to whether a firm pays cash dividends. Based on Grullon et al. (2011), we use the 
following alternative specifications: a firm is considered a payer when 1) the value of total 
dividend payout is greater than the value of stocks that are bought back, 2) the value of total 
dividend payouts plus the change in the value of treasury stock is positive
25
, and 3) the value 
of purchase of common and preferred stock minus sale of common and preferred stock is 
greater than zero. In order to test our prediction using Grullon et al.’s (2011) alternative 
definitions, we run three sets of logistic regressions in which the dependent variables are the 
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 We also examine the effect of CEO compensation on the payout ratio and dividend yield by replicating the 
analyses presented in Tables 4 through 5. In unreported results, we observe that most variables do not have a 
statistically significant effect on the payout ratio and dividend yield, including common variables such as firm 
size and profitability. In fact, in these tests (including endogeneity tests), the only variable that consistently 
provides statistically significant results is the vega confirming that convex compensation decreases payouts.  
25
 In this definition, we replaced the change in the value of treasury stock with purchase of common and 





dummy variables. The results are presented in Tables 7 and 8. Based on the central 
hypothesis of our paper, the coefficients of CEO Inside Debt and CEO Delta/Vega Ratio 
should be positive, whereas the CEO Vega should be negative. The results of models (2), 
(4), (8), and (10) in Table 7 show that two out of three CEO inside debt proxies are positive 
and significant at the 1% level, regardless of which control variable is used in the model. 
Similarly, according to the models (5), (8), (9), and (10), CEOs with high delta/vega ratio are 
likely to have a positive net payout, thus supporting the main hypothesis of our paper. 
However, our new results are somewhat surprising. In model (7), the coefficient of CEO 
vega is significant only at the 10% level. More importantly, when other CEO variables are 
included in the model, the sign of the CEO vega becomes positive. While this is not in accord 
with our main hypothesis, there is a possible explanation; this could be because high vega 
CEOs may be engaging in stock buybacks when they do not have investment opportunities, 
thus yielding mixed results. 
When we look at the control variables, we observe that CEOs with longer tenure, 
profitable firms, and firms with high retained earnings are likely to have positive payouts. 
Conversely, firms that increase their assets are less likely to have positive net payouts. These 
results are consistent with the literature. However, we find that older CEOs are likely to have 
a negative net payout, which contradicts with the literature and our hypothesis. The literature 
suggests that older CEOs are more likely to be conservative, and we predict conservative 
CEOs to have positive net payouts. It may be that older CEOs are overconfident and choose 
to invest in their own stock. Overall, however, the findings regarding the effect of CEO inside 
debt and CEO delta/vega ratio strongly support the core hypothesis of our paper; 





The results in Table 8, based on the second dummy variable we derived following 
Grullon et al., are similar to those in Table 7. In models (2), (3), (4), (8), (9), and (10), CEO 
Inside Debt is positive and significant mostly at the 1% or 5% level. In models (5), (8), (9), 
(10), the effect of CEO Delta/Vega Ratio on payouts is positive and significant at the 1% 
level, regardless of all other variables included in the regression. CEO Vega is initially 
negative in model (7); however, in models (8), (9), and (10), it is not significant once all other 
variables are included in the regression. While the findings regarding CEO tenure, change 
in assets, profitability, and retained earnings are similar to those in Table 7, our findings 
regarding CEO age are mostly insignificant.  
The third set of regressions is based on Grullon et al.’s alternative definitions, where 
the dependent variable is one if the value of purchase of common and preferred stock less 
sale of common and preferred stock is positive, and zero otherwise. While we do not present 
these results for brevity, they are available upon request. The results show that the effect of 
most variables, including common variables such as profitability, change in assets, and 
retained earnings on the propensity of positive net payouts are not statistically significant. 
Results regarding the effect of CEO risk aversion on the propensity to have a positive net 
payout are consistent with the central hypothesis of our paper. We find that CEOs whose 
relative leverage is higher than the firm leverage are more likely to have positive payouts. We 
also have little evidence showing that firms run by CEOs with high delta are likely to have 
positive net payout whereas those run by high vega CEOs are less likely to have a positive 
net payout. The results regarding the return volatility are consistent with the literature; firms 
with high return volatility are less likely to have a positive net payout. However, results of this 





likely to have a positive net payout, which is inconsistent with the literature; therefore, the 
findings of this model are questionable.   
Overall, two out of three alternative definitions that we derived based on Grullon et 
al. show that firms run by conservative CEOs are more likely to have positive payouts. 
Conversely, firms that are run by risk-seeking CEOs tend to have negative payouts. These 
findings support the central hypothesis of our paper.  
1.3.7 Robustness check: CEO risk preferences and dividend increases, initiations, and 
omissions 
In this subsection, we test another possible source of endogeneity. Our original 
analyses test CEOs’ propensity to pay dividends; hence, our examination may be biased 
because the firm may have or may not have been paying dividends when the CEO took 
office.  A probable solution to this issue is to test the effect of CEO compensation on 
dividend policy changes (i.e., dividend increases, cuts, initiations, and omissions) during the 
CEO’s tenure. This would ensure that dividend policy decision is affected by the CEO’s risk 
preference and alleviate the aforementioned concerns.  
We examine the effect of CEO risk preferences on dividend policy changes in Table 
9 and 10. First, we examine dividend increases. In these tests, the dependent variable is set 
to one if firm i’s dividend per share at time t is greater than that of time t -1, and zero 
otherwise. In models (2), (3), and (4) of Table 9, the coefficients of inside debt proxies are 
all positive and significant at no less than the 10% level. Significant at the 1% level, the results 





more likely to increase dividends.
26
 The results of model (5) regarding the effect of CEO 
Delta/Vega Ratio on the propensity to increase dividends suggest that a one point increase 
in CEO delta/vega ratio increases the propensity to increase dividends by 1.52%.
27
 
Conversely, the results of model (7) show that CEOs with convex compensation (i.e., CEOs 
with high vega) are less likely to increase dividends. Estimation results of model (7) indicate 
that a $1000 increase in CEO vega decrease the propensity to increase dividends by 2.57%.
28
 
As before, we estimate the last three models by including all our proxies. We find that inside 
debt proxies become insignificant when other risk preference variables are included to the 
model. However, the CEO Delta/Vega Ratio and CEO Vega are still significant at the 1% 
level and support the central hypothesis of our paper. In addition, CEO Equity becomes 
significant at the 1% level with a positive sign, thus indicating that non-convex equity 
compensation increases the likelihood of dividend increases.  
The control variables in these regressions point out that larger firms and firms with 
high retained earnings are likely to increase dividends. Conversely, firms that invest in R&D, 
firms that increase their asset stock, or risky firms are less likely to increase dividends. These 
findings are consistent with the literature which suggests that small firms, risky firms, and 
firms with growth opportunities are more likely to retain earnings.  
Next we examine the effect of CEO risk preferences on dividend initiations. Note 
that this is a subsample-based analysis; in this examination, we run logistic regressions among 
the firms that were non-payers at time t-1. Naturally, the dependent variable is set to one if 
the firm starts paying dividends at time t, and zero otherwise. The results of the regression 
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models in Table 10 show that the CEO Delta/Vega Ratio and CEO Vega are stronger 
determinants of dividend initiations compared to all other variables, including firm 
characteristics. We find in model (5) that a one-point increase in CEO delta/vega ratio 
increases the propensity to initiate dividends by 0.52.
29
 In model (7), we find that a $1000 
increase in CEO vega decreases the propensity to initiate dividends by 0.71%.
30
 The results 
of models (8), (9), (10) are estimated using all CEO proxies and show that the CEO 
Delta/Vega Ratio is significant, regardless of other variables in the model. In model (9), its 
economic significance more than triples when the Log of CEO Relative Leverage is added 
to the model; however, CEO Vega becomes insignificant. Across the models presented in 
Table 10, the only statistically significant firm level variable is Change in Assets, suggesting 
that dividend initiations are mostly determined by the CEO delta/vega ratio, CEO vega, and 
whether or not the firm increases its outstanding assets.  
Finally, we study the effect of CEO risk preferences on the propensity to omit 
dividends. While we do not present these results for brevity, they are available upon request. 
In our regressions, we find little evidence showing that CEOs with longer tenure or a higher 
delta/vega ratio are less likely to omit dividends. However, results regarding the effects of 
retained earnings and return volatility are consistently significant and stronger in all models. 
Finally, we examine the effect of CEO risk preferences on the propensity to reduce 
dividends; we find the only variable that affects the propensity to decrease dividends is the 
change in assets. However, it is worth pointing out that the analyses on the propensity to omit 
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or reduce dividends are subsample-based analyses and the findings of these analyses may be 
questionable due to small sample size. 
In sum, the results regarding the effect of CEO risk preferences on the propensity to 
increase or initiate dividends show that CEO risk preferences are strong determinants of 
dividend increases and initiations. The findings regarding the propensity to omit or reduce 
dividends are mixed, and the small quantity of statistically significant results indicate that firm 
characteristics play more of a role in dividend omissions or decreases than CEO risk 
preferences.  
1.3.8 Robustness check: Using an alternative period characterized by high investor 
sentiment 
To test the sensitivity of our results, we conduct an additional robustness test by 
replicating our main analysis with a larger sample that contains data from 1995 through 2008. 
We exclude the period after 2008 due to the recent near-collapse of the financial system, 
which could have increased CEO risk aversion, causing higher sensitivity to pay dividends.
31
 
Further, this section examines whether our results remain robust over a period that is 
characterized by high investor optimism (Baker and Wurgler, 2004). Thus, in this section 
we examine whether our findings are robust to market conditions and are not sample 
specific. However, in this section, the effect of inside debt on dividend policy is not analyzed, 
but we investigate the effect of stock option values, deltas, and vegas, using the approximation 
method of Core and Guay (2002) instead of the full information method, on dividend policy. 
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This is because detailed information on stock option tranches and inside debt data have only 
been available since 2006. 
Table 2 Part B presents the descriptive statistics of this dataset, showing that CEO Vega 
is higher while CEO Delta/Vega Ratio is smaller among non-paying firms,
32
 dividend-paying 
firms are managed by older CEOs or CEOs with longer tenure, and dividend-paying firms 
are larger and have fewer growth opportunities (e.g., a smaller Market/Book Ratio or higher 
Sales). These results are in line with our prior findings that risk-seeking (risk-averse) CEOs 
have a lower (higher) propensity to pay dividends.  
 Using this extended dataset, we re-run logistic regressions, testing the effect of CEO 
risk preferences on the propensity to pay dividends, and report the results in Table 11. While 
in model (1) we find that CEO Cash Compensation does not significantly affect dividend 
policy, in model (2) the coefficient of CEO Delta/Vega Ratio is 0.0018 indicating that a one-
point increase in the delta/vega ratio increases the propensity to pay dividends by 0.18%.
33
 
However, this finding is less significant compared to our previous results. Further, the results 
in models (3) and (4) indicate that a $1 million increase in equity compensation or a $1000 
increase in vega decreases the propensity to pay dividends by 0.31% or 2.98%, since the 
coefficients of CEO Equity and CEO Vega are -0.0031 and -0.0303, respectively.
34
 Estimated 
by using all proxies, model (5) shows that vega significantly decreases the propensity to pay 
dividends. Similar to the previous findings, the sign of CEO Equity becomes positive in this 
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 According to the descriptive statistics, there are two main differences between the original dataset and the 
larger dataset. First, in the smaller set, the change in assets is significantly higher in the subsample of non-paying 
firms. Second, in the large dataset, there is no statistically significant difference between non-payers and payers 
in terms of firm size (i.e., market equity). 
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 implying that high equity compensation increases managerial conservatism and thus 
dividend payout when not convex, i.e., when the model includes vega as a control variable 
(see Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991).  
In sum, these logistic regressions further support our hypothesis that CEO 
compensation is a determinant of dividend policy and, in particular, convex pay packages 
decrease the propensity to pay dividends. While the coefficients of CEO Equity and CEO 
Vega are smaller than those in previous findings, the results are still significant at the 1% level 
and confirm our prior findings. Therefore, we still find evidence showing that CEO risk 
preferences play a role in dividend policy in a period of high market sentiment
36
. 
1.3.9 Robustness check: Market’s preference for dividends  
The catering theory of Baker and Wurgler (2004, pg. 1160) suggests that “managers 
give investors what they currently want.” In the case of dividends, the theory predicts the 
majority of firms decide to pay dividends when dividend paying firms trade at a premium 
(i.e., when the market prefers dividends over capital gains)
37
. Thus far, we find that risk-
seeking managers are less likely to pay dividends. However, according to Baker and Wurgler 
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 We observe the same in Tables 4 and 5. 
36
 We employ the same endogeneity test as before based on Shen and Zhang (2012) to check the robustness of 
these findings in the larger dataset. We find that the results are still consistent with the central hypothesis of the 
current method. While we do not present the results for brevity, they are available upon request. 
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 Baker and Wurgler (2004) test this theory with the following model (pg. 1148): 
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑃𝑡−1






+ 𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝑓𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡. 
In this model, 𝑃 
𝐷−𝑁𝐷 is the dividend premium, which is the log of the average market-to-book ratio of dividend 
paying firms (𝑃𝐷) less that of the non-paying firms (𝑃𝑁𝐷). 𝑀/𝐵 is the average market-to-book ratio of non-
paying firms, and 
𝐷
𝑃




), and finally Year is the calendar year. The theory predicts the coefficient of the 
dividend premium b to be positive suggesting that when the market prefers dividends (i.e., when the dividend 
premium is high), the propensity to pay dividends should be higher. This prediction is supported empirically 





(2004), the disappearance of dividends is due to the market’s preference. Hence, it is 
necessary to run this final analysis to investigate whether our findings still hold after 
controlling for the market’s preference for dividends. We do so by introducing the Relative 
Dividend Premium (RDP) variable in our baseline regression, which, in the spirit of Baker 
and Wurgler (2004), is defined as the value-weighted average of dividend paying firms’ 
market-to-book ratio minus the market-to-book ratio of firm i at time t. Formally, we estimate 
the following model: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑃𝑎𝑦) = 𝑎 + 𝑏 𝑅𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑡 +  𝑣𝑡 
In this model, RDP is the relative dividend premium as defined above; Firm is a set 
of firm-level control variables; CEO is the set of CEO compensation variables that are used 
throughout the current study; and Fixed is a set of binary variables based on year and two-
digit industry codes. Similar to the previous section, we conduct this test for the 1995 to 2008 
period. Consistent with the catering theory, RDP is expected to have a positive impact on 
the propensity to pay dividends. If our findings continue to show that CEO Delta/Vega Ratio 
or CEO Vega exert a significant effect on the propensity to pay dividends, even after we 
include the RDP in the estimation model, they would indicate that they are not sensitive to 
specific market conditions.  
Table 12 presents the logistic regression results. The first regression model, in accord 
with the prediction of catering theory, shows that the coefficient of Relative Dividend 





in dividend paying firms market-to-book ratio relative to that of the firm i, increases the 
propensity of firm i to pay dividends by 40 times
38
.   
In the next four regression models, we examine the significance of the CEO risk 
preference variables when RDP enters the model. While we do not find a relationship 
between CEO Cash Compensation and the propensity to pay dividends in Model (2), the 
coefficient of the CEO Delta/Vega Ratio, in Model (3), indicates that it has a positive 
standalone effect on the propensity to pay.  Significant at the 5% level, this finding aligns with 
the central hypothesis of this study suggesting that conservative managers are more likely to 
pay dividends compared to others. The results in models (4) and (5) are also in line with the 
central hypothesis of the current paper and stronger compared to those in Model (3). The 
results of models (4) and (5) suggest that higher equity compensation or convex 
compensation leads to a lower propensity to pay dividends. 
The sixth model is estimated with all the CEO risk preference variables; similar to 
our previous findings, the sign of the CEO Equity changes to positive and both CEO Equity 
and CEO Vega are highly significant. This consistently suggests that convex equity 
compensation decreases the propensity to pay dividends whereas non-convex equity 
compensation leads to risk-aversion (see Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991) and as a 
result increases the propensity to pay dividends. In economic terms, we find that a $1 million 
increase in CEO Equity compensation increases the likelihood of the propensity to pay 
dividends by 0.32%, whereas a $1 thousand increase in CEO Vega decrease the propensity 
to pay dividends by 3.32%, even after controlling for the market’s preferences for dividends
39
. 
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These findings provide incremental support to our argument that risk-seeking managers are 
less likely to pay dividends. More important, this examination shows that our findings are 
robust to the market conditions.  
1.4 Conclusion 
This study examines whether risk aversion-inducing CEO compensation motivates 
managers to pay more dividends regardless of investor preferences. Using inside debt (i.e., 
pensions and deferred compensation) and the sensitivity of CEO equity compensation to 
stock price changes (i.e., high CEO delta), as proxies of CEO risk aversion, we document 
that inside debt induces CEOs to pay dividends while CEOs with convex compensations 
decrease dividend payout.  
Our tests are performed using two data samples, from 2006 through 2011 and from 
1995 through 2008. We use the former as the main dataset, since it includes inside debt, and 
we use the latter for increased robustness. Confirming our predictions, our results show that 
high inside debt (i.e., pension and deferred compensation) and CEO delta increase the 
propensity to pay dividends, whereas convex compensation (i.e., vega) decreases payouts. 
This implies that risk-averse/risk-seeking CEOs are more/less likely to pay dividends. We 
end our empirical analysis by examining how the market’s preference affects the dividend 
policy of firms run by risk-averse and risk-seeking managers. Consistent with our main 
findings, we find that risk-seeking managers are less likely to pay dividends even when the 






CHAPTER 2: CATERING THEORY AND STOCK PRICE 
REACTIONS TO DIVIDEND INITIATIONS AND OMISSIONS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
According to catering theory of Baker and Wurgler (2004), the disappearance of dividends 
since the 1980’s is attributed to investors’ preference of non-dividend paying firms (non-
payers, hereafter) and managers catered to this demand by not paying dividends. The 
intuition behind catering theory is that investors exhibit a time-varying demand for dividend-
paying firms (payers, hereafter): when the market sentiment is low, investors prefer payers 
for certain gains. Conversely, investors prefer non-payers for capital gains when the market 
sentiment is high, thus increasing the share prices of non-payers. Hence, in an attempt to 
maximize share prices, managers cater to the market’s preferences: they pay dividends when 
dividend-paying firms trade, on average, at a premium compared to non-paying dividends. 
Conversely, managers are more likely to discontinue dividends when non-payers trade at a 
premium. However, unlike the prediction of catering theory, the market may interpret 
dividend omissions as a “signal” of poor prospects and may force omitting firms’ share prices 
to drop (Aharony and Swary 1980; Bhattacharya 1979; Miller and Rock 1985; Michaely, 
Thaler, and Womack 1995). The objective of this study is to examine empirically which of 
these views is more consistent with reality.  
 To address this issue, we analyze the market’s reaction to dividend initiations and 
omissions over the period of 1980-2010, as this period is mostly characterized with high 





capital gains compared to payers
40
. In accord with the prediction of catering theory, due to 
the market’s preference for dividends, initiating (omitting) firms’ stock returns are expected 
to be lower (higher) compared to the pre-initiation (-omission) period.  
In order to test these predictions, we collect data from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices, Kenneth French’s website, and Jeffrey Wurgler’s website. Following 
Michaely et al. (1995), we examine the 36-month periods before and after dividend initiations 
and omissions
41
. First, we find that initiating firms’ average return is 2.02% in the pre-initiation 
period and 1.27% in the post-initiation period.  Omitting firms’ average return is -0.42 in the 
pre-omission period and .09% in the post-omission period. These results are in support of 
catering theory since initiating firms perform worse in the post-initiation period while 
omitting firms perform better in the post-omission period. Second, the average cumulative 
abnormal returns (ACARs) over the 36-month periods before and after initiations and 
omissions are analogous to our prior findings and consistent with catering theory. In our 
sample, the 36-month ACARs of initiating firms is 63% and 11%, before and after initiations, 
respectively. The 36-month ACARs of omitting firms are -69% and -16%, before and after 
omissions, respectively. Last, multivariate analyses, based on the Fama–French four-factor 
model (see Fama and French, 1993), confirm that initiating firms perform worse after 
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 Baker and Wurler (2004) report that the dividend premium (i.e., the demand for dividend paying firm) was 
low in the 1980-2000 period with non-paying firms trading mostly at a premium due to high market sentiment. 
The updated dividend premium and sentiment data for the period of 1980-2010 are available on Jeffrey 
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and 268 omissions. In our sample, especially in the last decade, the number of non-payers to payers is two to 
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initiations whereas omitting firms perform better after omissions. According to our findings, 
in the period of 1980-2010, initiating firm’s average risk-adjusted yearly return is almost 6% 
lower in the post-initiation period compared to the pre-initiation period. Conversely, that of 
omitting firms is more than 16% higher in the post-omission period compared to the pre-
omission period. Thus, our findings are in accord with the catering theory prediction that 
investors favor non-payers in the presence of high sentiment. The reason our findings are 
opposite of Michaely et al. (1995) is probably due to their sample period, 1964-1988. During 
almost two-thirds of their sample period, the dividend premium was positive, indicating that 
payers traded at a premium. Collectively, our results suggest that the signaling effect was less 
prominent in the 1980-2010 period, a period mostly characterized by investor optimism (i.e., 
strong preference for non-payers).  
We repeat our examination for three sub-sample periods: 1980-1990, 1991-2000, and 
2001-2010.  The objective of this robustness test is to examine 1) whether our results are 
specific to one sub-period, and 2) whether the market’s reaction to dividend initiations or 
omissions is related to changes in sentiment (or the dividend premium) as predicted by 
catering theory. In Figure I, we plot the dividend premium and market sentiment. Note that 
the market sentiment is high in the early 1980s, yet drops gradually and dips below zero 
around the Savings and Loan crisis in 1991. In the 1990s, there is a general upward trend 
and the sentiment index peaks in 2000, right before the burst of the dot-com bubble and the 
9/11 terrorist attacks. In the 2003-2007 period, it starts to recover from the terrorist attacks 
and ramps up with the housing bubble. Over this period, notice that the dividend premium 
is significantly below zero, indicating a stronger demand for non-payers. In the 2003-2007 





return. In addition, the US housing index increased by more than 44%. Most likely, investors 
wanted to ride this wave and demanded capital gains instead of dividends. If catering theory 
holds, the stock price reaction to dividend initiations and omissions should be associated 
with the market’s sentiment and the dividend premium. 
Our results are mostly in agreement with this argument. We find a negative market 
reaction to dividend initiations in all three decades. However, the only significant result is 
during the 2001-2010 period. In fact, when we limit the sample to years 2003 through 2007 
(the period between the 9/11 and the burst of the housing bubble, in which both the housing 
and stock markets were bullish), the results are more significant, confirming the prediction 
of catering theory that when the market sentiment is high the price reaction to initiations is 
negative.  We also find a positive reaction to omissions in all sub-sample periods, but the 
magnitude of the market’s reaction to omissions is higher in the 2000s, yet the statistical 
significance of the results is stronger in the 1990s. Similar to the findings regarding initiations, 
the result of the analysis during the 2000-2010 period are more significant during the era 
characterized by high sentiment due to the booming housing and stock markets. As before, 
when we limit our analysis to this high sentiment period, the positive effect of omissions on 
stock prices turns out to be more significant. In sum, our results support the proposition of 
catering theory: during times of high sentiment, investors prefer non-payers and firms 
perform worse (better) subsequent to initiations (omissions). However, the conjecture that 






2.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
In perfectly efficient and frictionless markets (e.g., no transaction cost, taxes, investor 
irrationality, information asymmetry), changes in dividend policy do not affect firm value 
(Miller and Modigliani, 1961). Miller and Rock (1985) relax the information symmetry 
assumption and argue that managers have more information than outsiders do regarding a 
firm’s prospects and dividend policy is determined depending on the firms’ future 
profitability. Hence, an increase (decrease) in dividends signals good (bad) news and should 
increase (decrease) the share price (see also Aharony and Swary, 1980), which is empirically 
confirmed by Michaely et al. (1995). The shortcoming of the signaling hypothesis is that it 
does not account for the market’s preferences (e.g., the market sentiment) for dividends. 
Relaxing the market efficiency assumption of Miller and Modigliani (1961), catering 
theory of Baker and Wurgler (2004) suggests that managers distribute or reinvest earnings 
depending on the market sentiment. This is because investors demand capital gains (as 
opposed to dividends) when the market sentiment is high. Conversely, investors prefer 
certain gains (i.e., dividends) when the sentiment is low. Hence, the catering theory predicts 
that, when the market is optimistic, investors prefer non-payers (i.e., when the dividend 
premium is negative) and managers will invest cash flows in growth opportunities, as opposed 
to paying dividends, for capital gains. A subtle and untested assumption of catering theory, 
addressed in this study, is that managers will omit dividends in an attempt to increase share 
price when the market sentiment is high (i.e., when the market prefers non-payers) and yet 
the market will not react negatively to dividend omissions -as in the signaling view.  
Baker and Wurgler (2004) measure the market’s demand for dividends via the 





sentiment index (see Baker and Wurgler, 2006). We plot these series in Figure I. As 
expected, there is a negative correlation between the dividend premium (i.e., investor 
demand for dividends) and the sentiment. Note also that over the period of 1980-2010, the 
dividend premium is mostly negative –with the exception of two years- meaning that non-
payers traded at a premium compared to payers. Baker and Wurgler argue that high investor 
sentiment is the main reason investors prefer non-payers to payers. If catering theory holds, 
over this period, initiating firms’ stock returns should be lower in the post-omission period 
whereas those of omitting firms’ should be higher in the post initiation period. The objective 
of this study is to test this hypothesis.  
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
We collect data from the Center of Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Kenneth 
French’s website, and Jeffrey Wurgler’s website
42
. Data on quarterly ordinary dividends and 
monthly returns adjusted to distributions are from the CRSP. Monthly Fama-French factors 
are from Kenneth French’s website. Available through 2010, the dividend premium and 
consumer sentiment data are from Wurgler’s website.  
Even though we analyze the initiations and omissions that took place after 1980, our 
stock return data begin in 1977 to calculate pre-event stock returns and to ensure a clean 
dividend history of initiations and omissions. Following the literature, we exclude utilities—
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 4900–4949—and financial firms—SIC codes 
6000–6999. To ensure that firms are publicly traded, we use firms with share codes of either 
                                                 
42






10 or 11. We trim stock returns at the 1% and 99% level to exclude outliers. We also exclude 
the firms that omitted or initiated dividends more than once.  
2.3.1 Qualifying dividend initiations and omissions 
We choose qualifying dividend initiating and omitting firms following Michaely et al. 
(1995). For a firm to qualify as an omitting firm, it has to meet the following two requirements 
(with CRSP variable mnemonics in parentheses). First, the firm must be present in the CRSP 
dataset with a non-missing stock return adjusted to distributions (retx) for 36 consecutive 
months and have paid quarterly cash dividends (adjodiv) for 12 consecutive quarters and 
second the firm must be present in the dataset and not have started paying dividends after 
the omission for at least 36 months. For a firm to qualify as an initiating firm, we require the 
following criteria. First, the firm must be present in the CRSP dataset with a non-missing 
stock return adjusted to distributions and not have paid dividends (adjodiv) for 36 
consecutive months prior to the event and second the firm must be present in the dataset 
and not have stopped paying dividends after the initiation for at least 36 months.  
2.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
We present our sample distribution in Table 1
43
. The percentages of firms that initiate 
and omit dividends show that between 1980 and 2003, the propensity to initiate dividends is 
lower than the propensity to omit dividends. Since over this period the dividend premium is 
mostly negative, this finding corroborates the catering theory implying that managers are less 
likely to pay dividend when the market prefers non-payers. The initiation rate increases 
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drastically in 2003 and exceeds that of omission. This is probably due to the Bush 
administration’s tax policy changes lowering the tax rates of dividend income.  
In Table 14, we present the mean returns of initiating and omitting firms before and 
after initiations and omissions. The pre-event mean returns are estimated over the 36-months 
before initiations and omissions. Post-event mean returns are measured over the 37-months 
including the event months and the subsequent 36-month periods. The mean monthly stock 
returns are 2.03% before initiation and 1.27% after initiation. The mean monthly stock return 
is -0.42% before omissions and 0.97% after omissions. According to t-tests, all the mean 
values are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. These results suggest that initiating 
firms perform poorly in the post-initiation period compared to their pre-initiation period, 
whereas omitting firms perform better compared to their pre-omission period. These 
findings are in support of the catering theory predicting that over periods when the market 
prefers non-payers, dividend initiations lead to lower stock returns, whereas dividend 
omissions result in equity value increases. 
2.4 Average cumulative abnormal returns before and after omissions and 
initiations 
To investigate the effect of dividend omissions and initiations on stock returns, we 
employ an event study approach. First, we calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (i.e., 
stock return less the market return) for each month up to 36 months prior and subsequent 
to dividend initiations and omissions. Next, we take the average of these returns across 
omitting and initiating firms. Formally, we calculate the cumulative abnormal return for asset 





𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1




where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is asset 𝑖’s return (the percentage change in the price of the asset from time 𝑡 − 1 
to 𝑡) and 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 is the return on the market for month 𝑡. Therefore, the average cumulative 
abnormal returns, 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅, after omissions and initiations are calculated as follows: 







We present the results of this analysis in Table 15. Note that we do ACAR calculation 
for the entire dataset and for three subsamples (i.e., for three decades). Results in Panel A 
show that 36-month ACAR of initiating firms is almost 6 times higher in the pre-initiation 
era compared to the post-initiation era (63% compared to 11%) in the full sample analysis. 
In addition, we find that initiating firms’ average return is 1.63% in the initiation month (t=0) 
and is 2.61% in the month prior to the initiation month (t=-1). This finding supports the 
implication of catering theory in the short-run since initiating firms perform poorly in the 
initiation month relative to the prior month. That is, in the periods when the market 
sentiment is high, market reacts negatively to dividend initiations. We find similar results in 
the periods of 1980-1990 and 2001-2010.   
In Panel B of Table 15, we present the results for omitting firms. In the full sample 
analysis, we find that the average returns of omitting firms one month prior to the omission 
and in the month of omission are -6.2% and -3.14%, respectively. This shows that omitting 
firms performed better in the omission month compared to the month before the omission. 





with prediction of catering theory that dividend omissions may increase share value when the 
market prefers non-payers. When we compare the 36-month periods before and after 
omissions, we find that omitting firms underperformed the market by 69% percent in the 
pre-omission period. However, they underperform the market by only 16% in the post-
initiation period indicating that omitting firms perform better in the post-omission period. 
More strikingly, our subsample analysis shows that over the 2001-2010 period, omitting firms 
outperformed the market by 31%. While omitting firms do not outperform the market after 
omissions in the other subsamples, they still perform better compared to the pre-omission 
period.  
2.5 Risk-adjusted returns: Augmented Fama–French model  
Using an augmented Fama–French model, we test whether the calculated ACAR 
values load entirely on risk factors, indicating that the ACAR values are due to firm size, 
growth opportunities, or the market premium. If so, we can conclude that dividend policy 
changes do not generate risk-adjusted return indicating that neither catering theory nor the 
signaling hypothesis can predict the effect of dividend policy changes on stock returns. The 
model that we estimate is as follows:
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𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼∆𝑖𝐷𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑏∆𝑖𝐷𝑡(𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡
+ 𝑠∆𝑖𝐷𝑡𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +  ℎ∆𝑖𝐷𝑡𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑜𝑖𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝑜∆𝑖𝐷𝑡𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
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 This model was originally used by Grullon et al. (2002). Charitou, Lambertides, and Theodoulou (2011) fine-





This model is estimated over the 36-month period before and after the dividend 
event, that is, −36 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 36, indicating 73 observations for each initiation or omission. The 
term 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the difference between the return on asset 𝑖 and the risk-free rate at time 
𝑡; (𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡), 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿, and 𝑀𝑂𝑀 are the Fama–French market premium, firm size, 
book-to-market ratio, and momentum risk factors, respectively; 𝛼𝑖is the abnormal return; 
and 𝑏𝑖, 𝑠𝑖 , ℎ𝑖 , and 𝑜𝑖 are factor loadings before the event. 
To capture the changes in risk-adjusted returns and factor loadings, a dummy variable 
𝐷𝑡 and its interaction with the Fama–French factors are added to the model, where 𝐷𝑡 is set 
equal to zero in the period before the initiation or omission and one otherwise. Hence, 
𝛼∆𝑖 , 𝑏∆𝑖, 𝑠∆𝑖,ℎ∆𝑖, and 𝑜∆𝑖 capture changes in risk-adjusted return, the market risk factor, the 
size factor, the value factor, and the momentum factor, respectively, after initiations and 
omissions. 
Our sample consists of 360 dividend initiations and 268 omissions. Hence, we 
estimate the augmented Fama–French model using 360 and 268 times for initiations and 
omissions, respectively. All the coefficients from these regressions are saved for the initiations 
and omissions separately, on which two-tailed t-tests are conducted on the cross section to 
check whether the estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero.  
Our coefficients of interest is 𝛼  and 𝛼Δ capturing the abnormal returns of initiating 
and omitting firms.  If our results show that 𝛼∆𝑖 is significant at conventional levels, it will 
indicate that dividend initiations or omissions generate abnormal returns that are not 
explained by Fama–French factors. Based on catering theory, we predict 𝛼∆ to be negative 





In addition, a positive and significant 𝑏∆𝑖, 𝑠∆𝑖,ℎ∆𝑖, or 𝑜∆𝑖 will indicate market premium 
increased and firms started acting like smaller, value firms (with a high book-to-market ratio), 
or high-momentum firms, respectively, after the dividend policy change. On the other hand, 
if the changes in the coefficients (i.e., 𝑏∆𝑖, 𝑠∆𝑖, ℎ∆𝑖, and 𝑜∆𝑖) are negative and significant, it will 
indicate that, after the dividend policy change, the market premium was low and firms started 
acting like large firms, glamour firms (with a low book-to-market ratio), or low-momentum 
firms. 
We present the results regarding initiations in Panel A and omissions in Panel B of 
Table 16. The results for the entire sample in Table 16 Panel A show that returns load on 
𝛼, (𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓), 𝐻𝑀𝐿, and 𝑆𝑀𝐿 positively and on 𝑀𝑂𝑀 negatively before initiations. All the 
mean values are significant at the 1% level, except for 𝑀𝑂𝑀. A positive 𝛼 indicates that firms 
had been generating positive risk-adjusted returns before the initiation suggesting that non-
payers are associated with higher risk-adjusted returns (i.e., non-payers trade at a premium 
before the dividend initiations).  
The most striking result is that 𝛼∆ (the coefficient of the dummy variable assigned to 
capture the effect of dividend policy change) is -0.47 and significant at the 1% level. This 
result suggests that initiations consistently trigger negative market reaction throughout the 
sample period. In economic terms, initiating firms’ average risk-adjusted monthly return is 
almost half a percent lower in the post-initiation period compared to the pre-initiation 
period
45
. This translates into an almost 6% discount each year (compounded monthly) for 
initiating firms. This finding supports the prediction of catering theory that there is less 
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 Taken together, initiating firms continue generating positive risk-adjusted returns, since 𝛼∆𝑖 plus 𝛼𝑖 is still 





demand for payers over the period of 1980-2010. We repeat the same analysis in our three 
subsample-periods to examine whether the demand for payers is time varying. As shown, 𝛼∆ 
has a greater coefficient and t-value in the period of 2001-2010. In additional subsample 
analyses, we find these results to be strongly related to the high sentiment 2003-2007 period 
during which both the stock market and the housing market were booming. However, we do 
not find significant results in the other two decades even though the coefficients are negative. 
Overall, our results indicate that dividend initiations triggered negative market reaction in all 
three decades, but the valuation effects were not as pronounced in the 1980s and 1990s, 
compared to the 2000s. 
Next, we examine the effect of omissions on stock returns. These results, presented 
in Table 16 Panel B, show that before omissions, the mean coefficients of (𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓), 𝐻𝑀𝐿, 
and 𝑆𝑀𝐵 are positive, while that of 𝑀𝑂𝑀 and 𝛼 are negative. The results based on the entire 
sample show that these coefficients are significant at the 1% level, with large t-values. A 
negative 𝛼 indicates that omitting firms had been performing poorly prior to the policy 
change, suggesting that payers, consistent with catering theory, trade at a discount. Capturing 
the changes in risk-adjusted returns after omissions, 𝛼∆ is 1.27 and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The change in risk-adjusted return is also economically significant. This implies 
that omitting firms’ average risk-adjusted monthly return is 1.27 higher in the post-omissions 
era. This is more than 16% yearly and 57% risk-adjusted return (compounded monthly) over 
the 36-month period after omissions. In general, while there is some variation across the 
three decades, these results demonstrate that the market’s reaction to dividend omissions is 






The subsample analysis shows that this finding is consistent and significant over the 
three decades. While the magnitude of 𝛼∆ increases in the latter decades, it is only significant 
at the 5% level in the latest decade. When we limit our sample to the period in which both 
the stock and the housing markets were bullish, we find that the significance increases to the 
1% level. Overall, the results show that omitting firms generate positive risk-adjusted returns 
since the 1980s. These findings are consistent with the prediction of the catering view that 
dividend omissions should boost the equity value when market sentiment is high.   
2.6 Summary of findings and conclusion 
The negative dividend premium, originally documented in the renowned study of 
Baker and Wurgler (2004), over the period of 1980-2010, suggests that the market preferred 
non-payers to payers. An untested prediction of catering theory, addressed in this study, is 
that initiating firms’ stock returns will be lower in the post-initiation period compared to the 
pre-initiation period. Conversely, omitting firms’ returns should be higher in the post-
omission period compared to the pre-omission period. This prediction contradicts the 
signaling view, which claims that dividend omissions signal bad news regarding the future 
prospects of firms, thus leading to a decrease in equity value.  
We test the effect of dividend policy changes on stock returns over the period of 
1980-2010 to shed more light on the validity of these conflicting views. Consistent with the 
prediction of catering theory, we find that firms perform better (worse) subsequent to 
dividend omissions (initiations) compared to the pre-omission (-initiation) period. Fama-
French regression results show that risk-adjusted returns in the post-initiation period are 
significantly negative mainly during the 2001-2010 period. In this period, initiating firms 





initiation years. We find stronger support for the catering theory among omitting firms. The 
Fama-French regression results show that omitting firms generate 16% more risk-adjusted 
yearly return subsequent to omissions compared to the pre-omission period. This translates 
to more than 57% risk-adjusted return over the 36-month period after omissions compared 
to the 36-month period prior to omissions.   In accord with the catering theory, our results 
show that managers omit dividends in an attempt to maximize share prices when the market 
is more optimistic favoring non-payers to payers. Nevertheless, our results contradict the 
signaling view, which predicts positive (negative) returns after initiations (omissions).  
 






CHAPTER 3: DIVIDEND POLICY AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
RISK 
3.1 Introduction 
The compensation and risk preferences of chief executive officers (CEOs) have always 
attracted much attention. Empirical and anecdotal evidence indicate that executive 
compensation structures that encourage risk-seeking behavior may increase firm risk. In this 
study, we contribute to the literature by examining the link between firm financial distress, 
dividend policy, and CEO risk preferences. One of the few studies in this area is a survey 
study by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990), which includes 80 observations from 1980 
through 1985. The authors conclude that the managers of distressed firms reduce dividends 
to increase firm liquidity, consequently reducing the risk of bankruptcy. In contrast, Grullon, 
Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) find an increase in firm risk subsequent to a decrease in 
dividend payouts. In this study, we provide a fresh look at this literature and address these 
conflicting findings by incorporating CEO risk preferences.  
We argue that a low payout policy may increase free cash flow and thus the debt 
capacity at the disposal of managers. If the CEO is a risk-taker, these additional resources 
could be invested in high-risk projects, thus increasing firm risk. If so, the findings of Grullon 
et al. (2002) are supported for risk-seeking managers. On the other hand, our view predicts 
that risk-averse CEOs will allocate retained earnings to decrease firm risk (e.g., reduce 
leverage, increase liquidity). Such findings would support DeAngelo and DeAngelo’s (1990) 






Our view is consistent with previous studies suggesting a trade-off between growth 
opportunities and dividend payouts (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz, 2006; Fama and 
French, 2001) and that managers invest in value-increasing projects when the market has a 
preference for capital gains over dividends (Baker and Wurgler, 2004). Different from these 
studies, we also acknowledge that the low payout policy is related to managerial risk-seeking 
behavior. If the data confirms our view, this would suggest that catering to investor demand 
by pursuing investment projects at the expense of dividend payouts increases the risk of 
bankruptcy. Moreover, such results would elucidate the findings of Hoberg and Prabhala 
(2009), who document that there is a negative association between risk and dividend payouts. 
Namely, our findings would indicate that the source of the risk mentioned in Hoberg and 
Prabhala (2009) may be due to managerial risk-seeking behavior.  
To test our view, we re-visit DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990), who argue that 
managers of distressed firms reduce dividends to increase firm liquidity, thus decreasing the 
risk of bankruptcy.
 46
 However, according to our view, in distressed firms, risk-seeking CEOs 
should be more likely to omit dividend, since they may pursue projects to revert firm 
prospects. This is similar to the gambling hypothesis of prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979), namely that people may exhibit a lottery-type behavior to cover previous 
losses.  
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 DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) suggest that the low dividend payout policy of distressed firms is to meet 
credit requirements or gain bargaining power against labor unions, both of which decrease the risk of financial 
distress. According to DeAngelo and DeAngelo, non-dividend paying firms should be financially stable 
regardless of managers’ risk preferences. This is because the authors assume that free cash flow will be allocated 
to avoid financial distress, which is a questionable assumption. In addition, more than one third of the managers 
report in their survey that they decrease dividends to invest in “new projects”; however, the authors do not 
provide information regarding the riskiness of these projects. Consistent with prospect theory, these new 





We re-visit DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) by first employing a clinical method 
allowing us to examine why managers omit dividends. As such, we scan the 10Ks of firms 
that omit dividends to determine why they do so. We find clear statements in dividend-
omitting firms’ 10Ks that some firms omit dividends to take on investment opportunities. 
For example, Infospace Inc. announced that the firm “intend[s to] retain [its] earnings to 
finance future growth, and therefore, do[es] not anticipate paying any cash dividends” (2009 
10K). In addition, Startek Inc. also “plan[s] to invest in growth initiatives in lieu of paying 
dividends” (2007 10K). These statements support our view. 
Second, we test our hypothesis against that of DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) in 
cross section on a dataset collected from Compustat, Center for Research in Security Prices, 
and Execucomp.
47
 This dataset comprises observations from the period of 2006 to 2012, 
because the inside debt data has been available since 2006. The main variables of interest in 
this study are proxies for managerial risk preferences, firm risk, and dividend payouts. We 
proxy for managerial risk preferences using (i) CEOs inside debt (i.e., sum of deferred 
compensation and pension), and (ii) the sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock return 
volatility (i.e., vega) and stock returns (i.e., delta). Previous literature suggests that inside debt 
induces managerial risk aversion, as it ties CEOs’ wealth to the value of a firm’s debt (Edmans 
and Liu, 2011; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007). On the other hand, high vega/delta ratio 
equity compensation (i.e., convex equity compensation) motivates risk-seeking behavior 
(Core and Guay, 1999; Cassell, Huang, Manuel Sanchez, and Stuart, 2012). We measure 
firm risk using Altman’s (1968) Z-Score (hereafter, Z-Score). According to Altman (1968), 
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 Our historical cross section enables an examination of the actual outcomes of managers’ decisions. This is 
more advantageous than survey data, as manager opinions can vary based on when the questions are posed 





firms with a Z-Score less than 1.8 are distressed, while those with a Z-Score equal to or more 
than 3.0 are stable. Last, we consider firms with dividend per share by exdate greater than 
0.0 at time t to be dividend payers, and we proxy for free cash flow using the difference 
between operating income and total dividend disbursements. 
In our multivariate analyses, we find that risk-seeking managers are more likely to 
omit and less likely to pay dividends in distressed firms. This casts doubt on the prior 
literature which suggests that managers of distressed firms reduce dividends as a risk-averse 
policy to increase firm liquidity or honor credit requirements. Instead, our findings imply 
that low payout of distressed firms may be due to managerial risk-seeking behavior. This 
finding is consistent with the gambling hypothesis derived from prospect theory and the 
findings of Grullon et al. (2002).
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Having established that low payout policy of distressed firms may be due to 
managerial risk-seeking behavior, we broaden the scope of our investigation. We examine 
the association between CEO risk preferences, low payout policy or free cash flow, and firm 
financial stability. We predict that risk-seeking managers will increase firm risk when they 
have high free cash flow. If so, firms that retain earnings (or firms with high free cash flow) 
and are run by risk-seeking managers should be more likely to be in financial distress. Our 
results support this prediction. Furthermore, we find that risk-averse managers (e.g., 
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 As a robustness check, we investigate the role of debt in distressed firms’ dividend policy. Risk-seeking 
managers may increase firm risk (e.g., increase leverage) and as a result, the cost of debt. If so, the low payout 
policy that we find in firms run by risk-seeking managers may hinge on liquidity constraints due to the high cost 
of debt (Jensen, 1986). The impact of leverage on dividend payout may be more significant in financially 
distressed firms, since these may have difficulty generating cash flow. To address this, we conduct robustness 
tests to examine whether our findings survive the effect of cost of debt on the dividend policy in distressed 
firms. Untabulated results (available upon request) show that the cost of debt financing significantly decreases 
the propensity to pay dividends in distressed firms. However, even after controlling for the cost of debt, we still 
find among distressed firms that risk-seeking managers have a lower propensity to pay dividends than risk-





managers with high inside debt) do not increase firm risk even when they have a high free 
cash flow. Complementing our previous findings, these results imply that the effect of free 
cash flow on firm risk is not uniform and depends on CEO risk preferences. Our study 
clarifies the contradiction between the findings of DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) and 
Grullon et al. (2002). We show that the effect of low dividend policy (i.e., free cash flow) on 
firm risk depends on CEO risk tolerance.  
In sum, we address whether taking on projects as opposed to paying dividends 
increases bankruptcy risk, which is especially relevant since the 2008 financial crisis 
demonstrated that irresponsible investment behavior in aggregate may lead to long-lasting 
macroeconomic decline. Our study shows that while fewer dividends increase the cash at the 
disposal of managers, which may be used to adjust capital structure or honor credit 
requirements, risk-seeking managers may allocate free cash flow in a way that increases firm 
risk. In our examination, convex compensation structures appear to be associated with 
financial distress in non-paying firms. However, inside debt appears to prevent managers 
from engaging in high-risk projects regardless of the availability of excess cash flow. In 
conclusion, we argue that investors should monitor the allocation of free cash flow and be 
leery of high-risk acquisitions in non-dividend paying firms, especially in firms run by CEOs 
with convex compensation.  
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: In section 2, we employ a clinical 
approach and investigate the relation between corporate investment activities and dividend 
omissions. In section 3, we continue our study in a traditional manner. As such, we briefly 
discuss relevant studies from the perspective of managerial risk preferences and the dividend 





describe the sources of data, sample selection, and variables used in the analysis. We employ 
multivariate analyses in the next two sections, before concluding the study in the final section.  
3.2 Why do firms omit dividends? A clinical approach 
In this section, we employ a clinical method to examine the reasons firms omit 
dividends by presenting facts from the 10Ks of firms that omit dividends. In our dataset, we 
determine that 33 firms omitted their recurring dividends in the period of 2006 to 2012. 
After carefully examining their 10Ks, we observe that all 33 firms made recent investments, 
and that 31 are planning to invest more in the future. This is consistent with prior literature 
indicating a trade-off between corporate investments and dividend payouts. For more 
concrete results, we explore dividend omitting firms’ justifications for their decisions to omit 
dividends. We observe that many firms that omit dividends provide forward-looking 
statements indicating their plan to invest in growth projects. Below, we present the most 
obvious statements indicating that firms omit dividends to invest in other projects or growth 
opportunities.  
1. “Infospace Inc. currently intend[s] to retain [their] earnings to finance future growth 
and therefore, do[es] not anticipate paying any cash dividends on [their] common stock in 
the foreseeable future” (2009 10K). 
2. “[Pulse Electronic Corp. does] not anticipate that [they] will make dividend payments 
in future periods. [They] believe that use of these funds can generate a higher return if 
utilized to continue the execution of [their] strategic initiatives” (2012 10K). 






4. Tuesday Morning Corp. discontinued their cash dividend in 2008, announcing that 
they will make acquisitions and that “stockholders must look solely to appreciation of our 
common stock to realize a gain on their investment” (2008 10K).  
Further, some firms such as Standard Motor Products Inc., Stein Mart Inc., and the 
Vicor Corporation do not provide specific reasons for omitting dividends, but report in their 
10Ks that they are seeking growth. These examples prove that firms may omit dividends to 
allocate cash flow in acquisitions or other projects with the hope of increasing shareholder 
value, supporting the central hypothesis of this study. Furthermore, these examples are 
consistent with Grullon et al. (2002), who identify an increase in firm risk subsequent to 
decreases in dividend payouts. 
We also notice that several firms such as Entercom Communications Corp. and A. 
H. Belo Corp. mention substantial indebtedness (i.e., high leverage) in their 10Ks in the 
years prior to the dividend omission year. We argue that this is consistent with the central 
hypothesis of the current study: Risk-seeking managers may follow risky corporate policies, 
which may not increase the firm’s cash flow; consequently, they may need to omit dividends.  
Next, we focus on firms that omit dividends for conservative-sounding reasons that 
may support DeAngelo and DeAngelo’s (1990) contentions. In our sample, we identify only 
seven firms providing either conservative or conservative-sounding reasons for their decision 
to omit dividends. We provide a simplified cash flow statement for these firms in Table 17 
for the years around the dividend omission, and discuss their operations below. In Table 17, 





1. “[Arctic Cat Inc.’s] investment objectives are first, safety of principal and second, rate 
of return” (2009 10K). In 2009, the firm paid dividends for the last time, and in the following 
two years, did not retire any debt obligations. The cash outflow of $0.95 million in 2011 is 
due to a stock buyback program. Note that the total amount of dividends was $3.7 million 
in 2009, but over the three-year period starting in 2009, their investments increased by $14.2 
million; $6.5 million; and $11.6 million, respectively. That is, the firm had enough cash to 
pay dividends, but managers preferred to allocate cash in investments. The negative cash 
flow from operations in 2011 is attributed to their $71 million investment in short-term 
securities (recorded under operating securities), which is an effort to increase liquidity. 
However, this is not to meet credit obligations; rather, the firm finances its working capital 
through short-term borrowing
49
. While this may seem as a conservative policy, it differs from 
the conservatism suggested in DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990), as the firm is not hoarding 
cash to meet long-term credit obligations. Instead, they reserve cash to buy inventories in 
case the demand for their product increases. 
2. Carmike Cinemas omitted dividend payouts in 2009. “[They] … [intend] to allocate 
available capital primarily to reducing [their] overall leverage” (2009 10K). The firm did so 
by reducing their credit obligations by more than $80 million in 2008 through 2010. 
However, the firm also made investments: They opened five theaters in 2009, and their 
investments totaled $10.5 million and $12.8 million in 2009 and 2010, respectively. These 
amounts are one and a half times and double the total dollar amount of dividends paid in 
2008. Finally, the firm announced they would be investing more if they have more profitable 
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 The nature of the business (the firm sells all-terrain vehicles and snowmobiles) indicates that they face 
seasonality. Their 10K suggests that they finance working capital through short-term lending. However, fearing 
that these funds may not be available (or may include covenants they cannot honor), they invested in short-





opportunities in the future. They announced in their 2009 10K that “[i]f opportunities exist 
where new construction will be profitable to us, we will consider building additional theatres 
in future periods.” Based on this, it appears that Carmike Cinemas sacrificed dividends to 
pursue investment. In other words, they financed their growth opportunities using cash that 
could be paid as dividends, rather than through outside financing.  
3. “During fiscal year 2009, [Pier 1 Imports] opened one new store and closed 26 store 
locations” (2009 10K). The firm omitted dividends in 2007, as “[t]he Company believed that 
discontinuing the cash dividend would provide financial flexibility as it executed its 
turnaround strategy.” The firm recorded more than $200 million in losses during the period 
of 2007 to 2009. In the same period, the firm’s net investments were positive, which implies 
they liquidated some investments. Finally, in the same period, the firm raised approximately 
$10 million through financing activities; however, these proceeds are from stock and stock 
options and not related to credit obligations. In 2009 (the year after the omission) the firm 
increased end-year cash and equivalents, which has been decreasing over the 2007-2009 
period. The firm’s 2008 10K suggests drastically declining sales due to the macroeconomic 
crisis. As part of the turnaround strategy, the firm may close up to 80 locations to reduce 
costs. Overall, Pier 1 Import’s financing practices are similar to what DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (1990) suggest: The firm allocates cash in the restructuring of its operations, 
instead of paying out dividends or seeking expansion.  
4. Furniture Brands Int’l., Inc. omitted dividend payouts in 2009. From 2008 to 2010, 
the firm had significant cash outflows related to their financing activities, and they still paid 
off more than $220 million of long-term debt. However, in their 2009 10K, they announced 
that “[they will] review all capital projects and are committed to execute only on those projects 





Accordingly, in 2009, they assumed 5 leases and acquired 40 stores. Though the firm did 
not pay dividends in 2008, resulting in savings of approximately $5.8 million, they made 
investments worth $5.3 million and $19.1 million in 2009 and 2010, respectively. While 
paying off long-term debt may seem a conservative policy, the practices of Furniture Brands 
Int’l., Inc. are similar to those of Carmike Cinemas: They allocated internal cash to 
investment projects or to pay off long-term debt, instead of paying out dividends.  
5.  “[Tempur-Pedic International] suspended [their] quarterly dividend payment to 
redirect the use of these funds to pay outstanding debt […].” They allocated a net of $400 
million cash to retire a chunk of their long-term debt in 2008 through 2011. While this may 
fit the prediction of DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990), the firm also announced that “[they] 
expect to increase investment in capital projects, to create operational efficiencies, and 
support future growth.” In years 2009 and 2010, the firm allocated $51 million in investment 
activities as opposed to paying out dividends. This amount is almost three times the amount 
of dividends paid in 2008. We argue that similar to Carmike Cinemas and Furniture Brands 
Int’l. Inc., Tempur-Pedic International decreased its leverage, although they also made 
significant investments. The amounts spent on these new investments exceed total amounts 
of dividends that could have been paid if the firm sustained the last dividend payouts. Note 
that these firms generated large positive cash flow from operations in the year they omitted 
dividends and over the two-year period following the omission. Therefore, even though these 
firms’ dividend omission decision seems like a conservative decision as per their 10K, it 
appears that they preferred capital investments to investments.  
6. Wabash National Corp. omitted dividends in 2009 “to enhance liquidity” (2010 
10K). In fact, the firm suffered weak liquidity and was not permitted to pay dividends because 





their net investments were very low in 2009 and positive in 2010, indicating they liquidated 
more assets than they acquired in 2010. In addition, according to their 2009 10K, “[t]here is 
doubt about [their] ability to continue.” Although they paid $45 million toward their 
revolving credit facility in 2008 and 2009, they borrowed $50 million in 2010, indicating that 
their indebtedness did not improve. In year 2008—the year before the omission—the firm 
made investments worth more than $12 million. Tracing their investment back until 2006—
two years prior to the dividend omission—we determine that the firm allocated $11.6 and 
$75.1 million cash in investments in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Based on this, we argue 
that the firm’s decision to omit dividends appears to be linked to its previous investments: 
Managers of the firm engage in large acquisitions, but fail to generate enough cash flow. This 
is consistent with the main idea of this study, namely that managerial investment decisions 
play a role in firms’ financial strength and dividend policy decisions.  
7. Winnebago Industries Inc. aims to “conserve capital and maintain liquidity” (2010 
10K). Their net investments are positive in years around the dividend omission year, 
indicating that the firm liquidated more assets than it acquired. The firm generated $33 
million cash from its operations in 2010, 11 times more than total dividends paid in 2009. 
However, according to their 10K, Winnebago has $10 million negative cash flow from 
operation in 2010 consequent to increased inventories caused by an economic slowdown. 
The firm’s practices fit with DeAngelo and DeAngelo’s (1990) prediction that firms omit 
dividends either to increase liquidity or honor credit requirements. 
In conclusion, of the 11 firms that we closely examine, only two—Pier 1 Imports and 
Winnebago Industries Inc.—omitted dividends either to increase liquidity or honor credit 





several firms clearly stated in their 10Ks that they omit dividends to invest in growth 
opportunities, while several others make significant investments after omitting dividends. 
Therefore, our clinical analysis indicates that managers may omit dividend payouts to allocate 
cash flow in investment projects. Further, our analysis suggests that dividend omissions may 
be due to recent unfruitful investment activities that drain firms’ liquidity. Overall, our initial 
clinical-based results favor the view that there is a trade-off between dividend payouts 
investment activities. Next, we continue our study in a traditional manner by first reviewing 
the related literature to enable to develop hypotheses that are finally empirically tested. 
3.3 Literature review and hypotheses 
3.3.1 Dividend policy and managerial risk-seeking behavior 
Fama and French (2001) show that firms seeking growth pay fewer dividends, 
because increasing assets-in-place substitute dividends. Grullon et al. (2002) document that 
firm systematic risk increases subsequent to dividend decreases, suggesting that firms invest 
excess cash flow in risky ventures when not paid out as dividends. In accordance with these 
studies, we conjecture that risk-seeking managers are more likely to increase firm risk, as risk-
seeking managers are less likely to pay dividends. Our hypothesis is also aligned to Baker 
and Wurgler’s (2004) catering story, namely that managers decrease payouts when the 
market demands capital gains to divert capital resources to risky projects, ultimately aiming 
to enhance firm’s future prospects. However, the market’s appreciation for capital gains may 
be related to the perception of high growth prospects without realizing that such a policy 
could result in higher firm risk. Hence, this study addresses a subtle issue not addressed by 
Baker and Wurgler (2004); because of managers’ catering, dividend omissions may be linked 





Prabhala’s (2009) argument that risk decreases dividend payouts. While they do not address 
the source of the risk, we develop an argument in which managerial risk preferences lead to 
higher firm risk and fewer payouts. Our examination elucidates the risk story in Hoberg and 
Prabhala (2009); we consider managerial risk preferences as the source of risk. 
3.3.2 Managerial risk preferences 
Following the prior literature, we proxy for managerial risk preferences using CEO 
equity compensation, CEO equity compensation sensitivity to stock return volatility and 
stock returns, and CEO inside debt. Under the traditional principal–agent framework 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), equity compensation aligns managers and shareholders’ 
interests by encouraging managers to take on value-increasing projects. Compensation 
schemes sensitive to stock return volatility, rather than stock returns (i.e., convex 
compensation) are more likely to encourage seeking risk (see among others Core and Guay, 
1999; Guay, 1999; Smith and Stulz, 1985), because convex compensation resolves 
managerial under-diversification, which may arise from high managerial ownership 
(Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991). In accordance with prior literature (see Cassell, 
Huang, Manuel Sanchez, and Stuart, 2012), we employ the CEO vega/delta ratio to measure 
CEO compensation convexity, and consider CEOs with a high vega/delta ratio to be risk-
takers. 
In addition, we use inside debt, which is a debt-like compensation leading to 
managerial conservatism, as it ties the value of CEOs’ wealth to the value of debt 
(Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong, 2010; Edmans and Liu, 2011; Sundaram and Yermack, 
2007). We predict that CEOs with high (low) inside debt will exhibit low (high) risk tolerance 





Sundaram and Yermack (2007), who determine a higher Z-Score for firms managed by 
CEOs with high inside debt, thus indicating a lower possibility of financial distress.  
3.3.3 Hypotheses 
We argue that low dividend policy may increase firm risk if the CEO is a risk-taker. 
Conversely, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) contend that distressed firms’ managers reduce 
dividends to decrease firm risk. We test these opposing views by examining distressed firms’ 
propensity to omit and pay dividends in relation to CEOs’ risk preferences. According to 
our view, risk-seeking managers should be more likely to omit (or less likely to pay) dividends 
when the firm performs poorly. This is because we predict these CEOs will invest cash flow 
in “castle-in-the-air” projects in the hope of rescuing the firm from possible bankruptcy. This 
hypothesis is consistent with the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), in which 
people take high-risk gambles to cover previous losses.  
For more concreteness, we examine how free cash flow affects the firm’s financial 
stability when the CEO is either risk-averse or a risk-taker. We predict that risk-seeking 
managers who do not pay dividends are more likely to increase firm risk. This is because 
fewer dividends increase cash, and consequently the debt capacity, that could be allocated to 
high-risk projects.  
3.4 Data 
We collect cross section data from the Center for Research in Security Prices, 
Standard Poor’s Compustat and Execucomp, and Bloomberg. Our main dataset comprises 
observations from the period 2006 through 2012, because CEO-deferred compensation and 





debt, which has been available since 2009. We exclude small firms (i.e., firms with total assets 
less than $0.5 million); utilities and financial institutions Standard Industrial Classification -
SIC- codes between 4900 and 4949 or 6000 and 6999).  
Our main variables of interest are the Z-Score, CEO inside debt, CEO vega, CEO 
delta, and dividend policy variables. The Z-Score is calculated using firms’ working capital, 
retained earnings, profitability, market value of equity, and sales (see Appendix 3 for the 
formula). Firms with a Z-Score less than 1.8 are considered distressed. Firms with a Z-Score 
equal to or more than 3.0 are considered stable, while other firms are considered to be in 
the “zone of ignorance” (Altman, 1968). We capture firm distress via a binary variable (i.e., 
Distressed Firm), which is 1.0 if the firm’s Z-Score is less than 1.8, and 0.0 otherwise. We 
also create a binary variable, Stable Firm, which takes the value of 1.0 if a firm’s Z-Score is 
equal to or more than 3.0. For different times, we compare distressed firms to all other firms, 
namely stable firms and firms in the zone of ignorance. We refer to these firms as non-
distressed firms. Dividend Payer and Retain Earnings are dummy variables. Dividend Payer 
is 1.0 if the firm’s dividend per share by exdate is greater than 0.0 at time t, and 0.0 otherwise. 
Retain Earnings is 1.0 if the firm retains all earnings at time t, and 0.0 otherwise. 
Among the CEO variables, CEO equity is calculated as the sum of restricted stocks, 
stock holdings, and stock options’ dollar value. CEO compensation convexity is measured 
through the CEO Vega/Delta Ratio. Using Black-Scholes option pricing formula (Black and 
Scholes, 1973), CEO delta was calculated as the change in the value of CEO equity due to a 
$1 change in the share price. CEO vega is the change in the value of CEO equity due to a 





literature (Cassell, Huang, Manuel Sanchez, and Stuart, 2012), CEOs with a high vega/delta 
ratio are characterized as more risk-seeking than the others.  
CEO inside debt is the second CEO risk preference proxy. This is calculated as the 
sum of CEO deferred compensation and pension. The value of inside debt is tied to the 
market value of the firm’s debt, and can be collected only after retirement. High inside debt 
is expected to lead to managerial conservatism (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Sundaram 
and Yermack, 2007). In particular, CEOs whose personal leverage (i.e., CEO inside debt to 
CEO equity ratio) is higher than firm leverage (i.e., debt/equity ratio) are expected to be risk-
averse. We predict non-paying firms run by CEOs with high inside debt will have a higher 
Z-Score. In our empirical analysis, we use a binary variable, High CEO Relative Ratio, which 
is 1.0 if the CEO’s personal leverage is higher than firm leverage and 0.0 otherwise, to capture 
managerial risk aversion. 
In addition, we use CEO age and tenure to proxy for CEO as control variables, as 
these affect CEOs’ risk preferences. Prior literature suggests that older CEOs or CEOs with 
longer tenure employ less risky policies, because they are closer to retirement, have 
accumulated enough wealth, and are more concerned about damaging their reputations 
(Berger, Ofek and Yermack, 1997; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2006).
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3.4.1 Descriptive statistics  
According to the view develop in this study, distressed firms should be associated 
with risk-seeking managers and have a lower propensity to pay dividends. To provide relevant 
insights from the data, Table 18 presents descriptive statistics for firms that are financially 
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distressed (Panel A) and non-distressed (Panel B). Note that the column on the far right 
(Panel C) shows the sample mean differences between distressed and non-distressed firms 
(i.e., distressed less non-distressed). The results show no significant difference between 
distressed and non-distressed firms in terms of payout ratio and dividend yield. Consistent 
with previous survey-based responses (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1990), we find that only 
7% of distressed firms pay dividends, compared to 34.5% of non-distressed firms. We also 
observe that compared to the CEOs of non-distressed firms, CEOs of distressed firms have 
a higher vega/delta ratio (0.810 compared to 0.428), and lower inside debt ($0.29 million 
compared to $0.84 million). These results are all significant according to two-tailed t-tests at 
the 1% level, indicating that financially distressed firms are largely managed by risk-seeking 
CEOs. We also find that CEOs of distressed firms have lower equity holdings ($15.67 
million compared to $25.26 million). This is consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976) in 
that equity compensation encourages CEOs to work in shareholders’ best interests. 
However, further analysis is required to reach a concrete conclusion because depending on 
its convexity, equity compensation may also lead to excessive risk taking. Thus far, the results 
indicate that financially distressed firms pay fewer dividends and are run by risk-seeking 
managers. These two findings are aligned to our view that risk-seeking managers invest in 
high-risk projects (as opposed to paying dividends), and thus increase firm risk. 
Descriptive statistics also show that distressed firms have significantly lower capital 
expenditures, but higher R&D expenses, indicating that non-distressed prefer low-risk 
investments. The non-distressed firms in our sample increase their assets on average by 6%, 
and their average market/book ratio is 2.09. On the other hand, the assets of distressed firms 





we find that compared to non-distressed firms, distressed firms are smaller (measured by 
market equity: $274 million compared to $724 million), less profitable ($193 thousand loss 
compared to $69 thousand profit), and have a significantly higher cost of debt (2.3% 
compared to 1.3%). Note that the number of observations for the cost of debt is considerably 
smaller, because of data availability. 
3.4.2 Correlation coefficients 
The correlation coefficients in Table 19 show a positive relation between Z-Score 
and firm size (27.54%), profitability (76.06%), and market/book ratio (10.91%). This pattern 
suggests that larger, more profitable, and firms with higher growth opportunities are less likely 
to be in distress. Consistent with the prior literature, we find that Z-Score is negatively 
correlated with CEO Vega/Delta Ratio (−31%) and R&D (−74%), indicating that risk-seeking 
managers and risky corporate investments increase the probability of financial distress. 
The cost of debt and Z-Score are negatively correlated (−29%) at the 1% level, 
implying that financially stable firms have a lower cost of debt. Unlike the argument of 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990), we find Z-Score is not significantly correlated with dividend 
yield or payout ratio. Finally, the correlation between Z-Score and CEO inside debt is not 
statistically significant, although we find that inside debt is positively associated with dividend 
per share (9.52%), dividend yield (6.28%), and dividend payout ratio (4.02%). The first two 
are significant at the 1% level, and the third is significant at the 5% level. Consistent with the 
central argument of this study, these findings indicate that, compared to firm financial 






3.4.3 Preliminary findings  
We begin our multivariate analyses by examining the effect of firm financial distress 
on dividend policy. The results show that distressed firms (i.e., firms with Z-Score less than 
1.8) are 59% less likely, and stable firms (i.e., firms with Z-Score more than 3.0) 1.17 times 
more likely to pay dividends compared to firms in the zone of ignorance
51
 (The results are 
omitted for scrutiny, but are available upon request). These findings coincide with DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo (1990), who note that most distressed firms pay fewer dividends. However, 
these findings may not be sufficient to conclude that managers of distressed firms decrease 
payouts to decrease firm risk. In the following sections, we fill this void by incorporating 
managerial risk preferences into our analyses. 
3.5 CEO risk preferences and the dividend policy of distressed firms 
3.5.1 Firm distress and propensity to omit dividends 
We begin our multivariate analyses through a cross section test of DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo’s findings. Unlike these authors, we argue that distressed firms may omit dividends 
to invest cash flow in high-risk projects, which increases the risk of bankruptcy. This 
hypothesis is derived from Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, which contends 
that people may take high-risk gambles to make up for prior losses. It also aligns to the 
findings of Grullon et al. (2002). If we find that distressed firms run by risk-seeking managers 
are more likely to omit dividends, then this would provide evidence supporting prospect 
theory’s gambling hypothesis. However, if we find that risk-averse managers are more likely 
to omit dividends in distressed firms, this would support the view of DeAngelo and 
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 Control variables in these regressions show that larger or more profitable firms have a higher propensity to 
pay dividends, which is consistent with the prior literature. Conversely, firms that invest in Capex and especially 
in R&D, a riskier type of investment, or firms that have a higher market-to-book ratio are less likely to pay 





DeAngelo, who argue that managers of distressed firms reduce dividend payouts as a 
conservative policy. We test these views by estimating the following model: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑂𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑃) = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑀 𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑗,𝑡
 





𝑦∈𝑌 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑗,𝑡
 
𝑠𝑖𝑐 ∈ 𝑆𝐼𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
In this model, the dependent variable is 1.0 if the firm omits dividends at time t, and 
0.0 otherwise. 𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is a set of variables (i.e., CEO equity compensation, CEO Vega/Delta 
Ratio, and CEO inside debt) to capture managerial risk preferences. 𝐼𝑁𝑇 is a set of 
interaction variables (Distressed Firm*CEO Equity, Distressed Firm*CEO Vega/Delta, and 
Distressed Firm*High CEO Relative Leverage) that capture the role of CEOs’ risk 
preferences in dividend omissions in distressed firms. 𝑓 , 𝑦𝑗,𝑡, and 𝑆𝐼𝐶  are control variables 
for firm characteristics, year fixed effects, and industry fixed effects, respectively. We present 
the results of this analysis in Table 20. In logistic regression, estimated coefficients are 
converted into percentages as follows: (𝑒coef. − 1) ∗ 100 
In model (1) and (2), the coefficients of CEO Equity and the interaction variable 
Distressed Firm*CEO Equity are insignificant. This implies that CEO equity compensation 
does not affect the propensity to omit dividends regardless of the firm’s financial stability. 
We continue our analysis by examining the effect of CEO Vega/Delta Ratio on the 
propensity to omit dividends. Based on prospect theory, we predict that risk-seeking 
managers will take on projects to revert the firm’s prospects. If so, risk-seeking managers 
(e.g., CEOs with a high vega/delta ratio) may be more likely to omit dividends when the firm 
is in distress. We test this hypothesis in models (3) and (4). We do not find a significant link 





in model (4), the coefficient of the interaction variable Distressed Firm*CEO Vega/Delta 
Ratio is 15.71 and significant at the 1% level. The results of model (4) suggest that in 
distressed firms, risk-seeking managers are highly likely to omit dividends. This finding 
supports the hypothesis we derive from prospect theory.  
Next, we examine the effect of CEO relative leverage on the propensity to omit 
dividends in models (5) and (6). In these models, the coefficients of High CEO Relative 
Leverage are −1.75 and −1.67, which are significant at the 5% level. In economic terms, the 
results of these models suggest that managers whose personal leverage is higher than that of 
the firm are 81%–82%
52
 less likely to omit dividends. Note that in model (6) the interaction 
variable Distressed Firm*High CEO Relative Leverage is insignificant, thus indicating that 
risk-averse CEOs do not omit dividends in financially distressed firms. This finding casts a 
doubt on DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) who suggest that dividend omissions among 
distressed firms is a conservative policy. 
In model (7), we combine all three managerial risk preference variables, and in 
model (8), we include all managerial risk preference proxies and interaction variables. The 
results of these models are consistent with the prior models in the same table: Risk-seeking 
managers are more likely to omit dividends in distressed firms. Our findings cast doubt on 
prior literature that suggests managers of distressed firms omit dividends as a conservative 
policy. 
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3.5.2 Firm distress and propensity to pay dividends 
In this section, we examine risk-seeking and risk-averse CEOs’ propensity to pay 
dividends in distressed firms. We estimate the same model in Section 5.1, except that now 
the dependent variable is 1.0 if the firm pays dividends at time t, and 0.0 otherwise. We 
present the results in Table 21. In model (1), the interaction of firm distress and CEO equity 
holdings is insignificant. In model (2) the coefficient of the interaction variable Distressed 
Firm*CEO Vega/Delta Ratio is −6.04, implying that in distressed firms a one-point increase 
in CEO Vega/Delta Ratio decreases the propensity to pay dividends by 99%.
53
 It is also 
interesting that the coefficient of Distressed Firm becomes insignificant when the Distressed 
Firm*CEO Vega/Delta Ratio enters the model. This suggests that the low payout policy of 
distressed firms could be attributed to managerial risk-seeking behavior. This is consistent 
with the central argument of this study, namely that risk-seeking managers decrease dividend 
payouts to invest cash flow in high-risk projects. 
In model (3), the coefficient of the interaction variable Distressed Firm*High CEO 
Relative Leverage is 2.46 and significant at the 1% level. Hence, our findings show that CEOs 
whose personal leverage is higher than that of the firm (i.e., risk-averse managers) are 10 
times more likely to pay dividends, even when the firm is in distress.
54
 Perhaps, this is because 
conservative CEOs fear that a reduction in dividends will signal poor future prospects to the 
market, which may collapse the value of equity (Miller and Rock, 1985). Such a reaction 
would adversely affect a firm’s ability to issue equity or debt in the future.  
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 (𝑒−6.04 − 1) ∗ 100 = −99% 
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We continue our analysis by combining all our proxies in model (4). We find that 
the coefficient of Distressed Firm*High CEO Relative Leverage is positive, but becomes 
insignificant, while other variables act the same with slightly different coefficient magnitudes 
and statistical significance. The change in the coefficient of Distressed Firm*High CEO 
Relative Leverage may be due to the interaction variable Distressed Firm*CEO Equity, 
which was insignificant in the first model. To address this, we estimate model (5) without this 
interaction variable, observing that the coefficient of inside debt becomes significant, but with 
a smaller coefficient and t-value compared to those in the second model. In addition, note 
that older CEOs and CEOs with longer tenure are more likely to pay dividends. The 
coefficients of these two variables are positive and significant at the 1% and 5% level, 
respectively.  
As a robustness check, we investigate whether the cost of debt affects the propensity 
to pay dividends among distressed firms. Jensen (1986) argues that debt may substitute 
dividends, since it increases cash flow to creditors. Our findings may be biased, as risk-
seeking managers may increase firm risk and thus the cost of debt (i.e., cash flow to creditors). 
Therefore, the high cost of debt may be reducing the propensity to pay dividends. To address 
this concern, we re-run the regression presented in Table 21, this time including the cost of 
debt as a control variable. (These results are omitted, but available upon request). We find 
that the cost of debt financing significantly decreases the propensity to pay dividends in 
distressed firms. However, even after controlling for the cost of debt, we still find among 
distressed firms that risk-seeking managers have a lower propensity to pay dividends than 
risk-averse managers. Overall, the results of this section support the view that the low payout 





3.6 CEO risk preferences and the effect of free cash flow on firm financial stability 
3.6.1 Earnings retention and firm distress 
In this study, we predict that risk-seeking CEOs may increase firm risk by investing 
in risky projects when they have more cash at their disposal. Note that retaining earnings can 
also increase the firm’s debt capacity and may lead to high leverage. With this view, we 
address two conflicting findings in the literature. On the one hand, DeAngelo and DeAngelo 
(1990) suggest that retaining earnings increases may help the firm decrease firm risk, 
assuming that the CEO allocated excess cash conservatively. On the other hand, Grullon et 
al. (2002) provide empirical evidence that a low payout policy increases firm systematic risk.  
In this study, we add to this literature by accounting for CEO risk preferences. As 
such, we argue that if the CEO is a risk-taker, non-paying firms should be more likely to be 
in financial distress, since risk-seeking CEOs are more likely to prefer risky opportunities. 
However, if the CEO is conservative, then retained earnings should be allocated to increase 
firms’ financial strength, in other words, increase a firm’s Z-score. We test this view with the 
following model:  
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑀 𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑗,𝑡
 





𝑦∈𝑌 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑗,𝑡
 
𝑠𝑖𝑐 ∈ 𝑆𝐼𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
In this model, the dependent variable is 1.0 if the firm is financially stable, and 0.0 
otherwise. We measure financial stability using the Z-Score, and consider firms with a Z-
Score equal to or more than 3.0 as stable. 𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘  is a set of variables (i.e., CEO Equity, CEO 
Vega/Delta Ratio, and High CEO Relative Leverage) measuring CEO risk tolerance. 𝐼𝑁𝑇 is 





CEO Relative Leverage, and Retain Earnings*CEO Vega/Delta Ratio) that capture the effect 
of CEO risk preferences on firm risk when CEOs retain earnings. As before, 𝑓 , 𝑦𝑗,𝑡, and 
𝑆𝐼𝐶  are control variables for firm characteristics, year, and industry fixed effects, respectively. 
According to our hypothesis, Retain Earnings*CEO Equity and Retain Earnings*CEO 
Vega/Delta Ratio should negatively impact a firm’s financial stability, as risk-seeking 
managers may invest cash flow in high-risk projects.  
The results obtained from the eight models used in this analysis are presented in 
Table 22. In the first model, we examined the effect of CEO Equity on the financial stability 
of a firm, and do not find a significant association. In model (2), we examine how non-
dividend paying CEOs with high equity compensation affect the firm’s financial stability by 
adding the interaction variable Retain Earnings*CEO Equity. We determine the coefficient 
of Retain Earnings*CEO Equity as −0.03 and significant at the 1% level. In economic terms, 
we find that $1 million increase in CEOs’ equity compensation in dividend paying firms 
increases a firms’ propensity to be financially stable by 3%.
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These findings indicate that managers with high equity compensation may increase 
firm risk when they have excess cash (e.g., when they do not pay dividends). Note that the 
coefficient of CEO Equity is 0.027 and becomes significant at the 1% level when the 
interaction variable Retain Earnings*CEO Equity is added to the model. This implies that 
in the absence of abundant cash, CEO equity compensation encourages CEOs to follow 
corporate policies that improve the firm’s financial stability.  
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In models (3) and (4), we repeat the examination described above for managers with 
high vega/delta ratio compensation (i.e., convex compensation that triggers risk-seeking 
behavior). In model (3), we find that a convex compensation alone does not have a significant 
effect on firm’s financial stability, since High CEO Vega/Delta Ratio enters the regression 
with an insignificant coefficient. In model (4), we employ the interaction variable Retain 
Earnings*CEO Vega/Delta Ratio to capture the effect of CEO compensation convexity on 
firm financial stability. The results of model (4) show that the coefficients of CEO Vega/Delta 
Ratio and Retain Earnings*CEO Vega/Delta Ratio are 2.74 and −2.76, respectively. 
According to our results, a one-point increase in the CEO’s vega/delta ratio in dividend 
paying firms increases the firm’s propensity to be financially stable by almost 15 times.
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Conversely, a one-point increase in the CEO’s vega/delta ratio decreases the firm’s 
propensity to be financially stable by 93%.
57
 These results suggest that risk-seeking managers 
that do not pay dividends (i.e., CEOs that retain all earnings) allocate cash flow to projects 
that increase firm risk. These findings confirm those of model (2). 
Next, in models (5) and (6), we examine how dividend paying and non-dividend 
paying managers with high inside debt affect a firm’s financial stability. We determine the 
coefficients of High CEO Relative Leverage as 1.068 and 1.16 in models (5) and (6) 
respectively, both of which are significant at the 1% level. These findings imply that when the 
CEO debt/equity ratio is above that of the firm’s (e.g., risk-averse managers), the firm is 
approximately two times more likely to be financially stable regardless of retained earnings.
58
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57(𝑒−2.79 − 1) ∗ 100 = −93.86% 
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In model (7), we combine all managerial risk preference variables, and in model (8), 
we include managerial risk preference variables and the interaction variables that capture the 
effect of CEO risk preferences regarding non-dividend paying on the firm’s financial 
strength. In model (7), the only significant variable is inside debt, indicating that risk-averse 
managers contribute to the firm’s financial strength. When we estimate the last model by 
including all proxies and interaction variables, the results show that the significance and 
magnitudes of our proxies decrease when other proxies enter the model compared to models 
(3), (5), and (7). Retain Earnings*CEO Vega/Delta Ratio and Retain Earnings*CEO 
Vega/Delta Ratio are significant at 5%, as opposed to 1%. However, the implications of these 
findings remain the same and reinforce our previous findings that risk-seeking CEOs with 
excess cash flow may increase the likelihood of financial distress. Findings regarding the 
control variables are consistent with the prior literature, as we confirmed that profitability 
and firm size strengthen the firm’s financial stability, whereas high R&D expenditures may 
cause financial distress.  
In conclusion, we find no evidence supporting the notion that a low payout policy 
improves a firm’s financial stability, as DeAngelo and DeAngelo suggest. Developed in this 
study, our view is supported by the data and complements Grullon et al. (2002). Primarily, 
the results demonstrate that non-dividend paying firms increase the likelihood of reducing 
financial stability if their managers are risk-seekers and/or compensation contracts are 
designed to incentivize risk-taking behavior.  
3.6.2 Free cash flow and firm distress: A robustness check 
In this subsection, we estimate a set of regressions similar to those described in Section 6.1, 
except we replace Retain Earnings with Free Cash Flow. Unlike the dummy variable Retain 





operating income and total dividends. The advantage of this variable is that it shows the 
amount of cash left at the CEOs disposal after dividends payouts, allowing us to control for 
a possible bias that may be caused by CEOs who pay dividends but still have a high free cash 
flow. We estimate the following model: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝐹𝐶𝐹 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑗,𝑡
 





𝑦∈𝑌 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑗,𝑡
 
𝑠𝑖𝑐 ∈ 𝑆𝐼𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
In this model, the dependent variable is 1.0 if the firm is financially stable at time t, 
and 0.0 otherwise. 𝐹𝐶𝐹 is free cash flow available to the CEO at time t. 𝐼𝑁𝑇 is a set of 
interaction variables (FCF*CEO equity, FCF *CEO High CEO Relative Leverage, and FCF 
*CEO Vega/Delta Ratio) that capture the effect of CEO risk preferences on firm risk when 
the CEO has high free cash flow. As before, 𝑓 , 𝑦𝑗,𝑡, and 𝑆𝐼𝐶  are control variables for firm 
characteristics, year, and industry fixed effects, respectively.  The results are presented in 
Table 23.  
The first model in Table 23 shows that firms with high free cash flow are more likely 
to be financially stable. A $1 million increase in free cash flow makes the firm 3.17 times 
more likely to be financially stable.
59
 In the next three models, we examine how free cash 
flow affects the firm’s financial stability when the CEO has high equity, convex compensation, 
or high inside debt, respectively. In model (2), we find that CEOs with high equity 
compensation do not affect the firm’s financial stability negatively or positively when they 
have high free cash flow at their disposal. This is interesting, as according to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), equity compensation compels managers to work in shareholders’ best 
interests. The results in model (3) indicate that firms run by high vega-to-delta ratio CEOs 
                                                 
59





(i.e. risk-seeking CEOs) are less likely to be financially stable when the firm has high free 
cash flow. This finding is consistent with our central argument that risk-seeking CEOs may 
increase firm risk when they do not pay out cash flow as dividends.  
The findings in model (4) show that the coefficient of FCF*High CEO Relative 
Leverage is positive (8.04) and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that firms with free 
cash flow are a lot more likely to be financially stable when the CEO is conservative (i.e., 
when the CEO has high inside debt). Note that the significance of Free Cash flow disappears 
when FCF*High CEO Relative Leverage is included in the model. According to this finding, 
the effect of free cash flow on firm financial stability depends on CEO risk aversion. Finally, 
we estimate model (5) by including all three interaction variables. The results of this model 
confirm those of the previous models.  
Overall, these findings support the central argument of our study that risk-seeking CEOs 
may increase firm risk when they have high free cash flow at their disposal, for example, 
when they do not pay dividends. 
3.7 Summary and conclusion 
In this study, we argue that the effect of low payouts on firm risk may depend on 
managerial risk preferences. Specifically, we argue that retained earnings may be invested in 
high-risk projects and increase firm risk if the non-paying firm’s CEO is a risk-taker. Our 
arguments offer a resolution to the conflicting findings on the effect of dividend policy on 
firm risk. On the one hand, based on an 80-firm survey study, DeAngelo and DeAngelo 
(1990) conclude that a low dividend policy increases firms’ financial distress, as high free 
cash is used to honor credit requirements or increase liquidity. On the other hand, Grullon 





risk. If our argument is true, conflicting findings in the literature could be attributed to varying 
CEO risk preferences. 
We test our view in multiple ways. First, we employ a clinical analysis to examine the 
reason firms omit dividends. In several firms’ 10Ks we find evidence indicating that firms 
omit dividends to take on investment projects. Second, we test whether the low payout policy 
of distressed firms’ (as documented in DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1990) is related to CEO risk 
preferences. We investigate whether managers of distressed firms invest in projects to revert 
the firm’s prospects, similar to the gambling hypothesis of the prospect theory. We find that 
in distressed firms, risk-seeking CEOs are more likely to omit and less likely to pay dividends, 
implying that the low payout of poorly performing firms may not be due to managerial 
conservatism, as argued in the prior literature; instead, it is due to CEOs’ risk-seeking 
incentives. 
Next, we turn to the big picture and examine whether firms that retain earnings or 
firms with high free cash flow are more likely to be in distress. Our view predicts that risk-
seeking CEOs increase firm risk when they have high free cash flow at their disposal. We 
confirm that firms with high free cash flow are more likely to be in financial distress when 
managers have convex compensation (i.e., risk-seeking behavior inducing compensation). 
The results also show that free cash flow decreases the likelihood of financial distress only if 
the CEO is conservative (i.e., when the CEO has high inside debt).  
In conclusion, our results suggest that the effect of dividend policy on firm risk 
depends on CEOs’ risk preferences: Managers with convex compensation packages are 
more likely to increase firm risk when they have high free cash flow, whereas CEOs with 





study implies that investors should monitor the allocation of free cash flow and be leery of 
high-risk acquisitions in non-dividend paying firms, especially in firms run by CEOs with 
convex compensation. CEO convex compensation, conventionally proposed to align agent 
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Appendix 1. Company variables 
This Appendix presents company variables in italics. Variables are listed in the 
alphabetical order and Compustat Mnemonics are given in parentheses. 
 Book Equity = Shareholder Equity – Preferred Stock + Balance Sheet Deferred Taxes and 
Investment Tax Credits (TXDITC); 
 Capex/Total Assets Ratio = Capital Expenditures (CAPX)/Assets (AT); 
 Daily Excess Return (𝑒) is estimated using the market model in the 36-month period before 
t = 0 𝑟 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝑎 + 𝛽 (𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) +  𝑒, where 𝑟 is daily stock return, 𝑟𝑚 is daily market 
return, 𝑟𝑓 is daily risk–free rate. Market return and daily risk-free is obtained from Kenneth 
French’s website (see footnote 9); 
 Debt/Equity = Liabilities (LT) / Market Equity; 
 Dividend Yield = Dividend per Share by ExDate (DVPSX)/Stock Price (PRCCF); 
 Dividend Payout Ratio = Total dividends [Dividend per Share by ExDate (DVPSX) * 
Shares Outstanding (CSHO)]/Earnings Available for Common; 
 Earnings Available for Common = Earnings before Extraordinary Items (IB) – Preferred 
Dividends (DVP) + Income Statement Deferred Taxes (TXDITC); 
 Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of Daily Excess Returns over the period of t= -
36 to t=-1; 
 Market/Book Ratio = Market Equity/Book Equity; 
 Market Equity = Stock Price (PRCCF) * Shares Outstanding (CSHO); 
 Net payout (1): Total dividends [Dividend per Share by ExDate (DVPSX) * Shares 





 Net payout (2): Total dividend payouts [Dividend per Share by ExDate (DVPSX) * Shares 
Outstanding (CSHO)] + the change in the value of treasury stock [or Purchase of Common 
and Preferred Stock (PRSTKC) - Sale of Common and Preferred Stock (SSTK)];  
 Net payout (3): Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock (PRSTKC) - Sale of Common 
and Preferred Stock (SSTK); 
 Preferred Stock = Preferred Stock Liquidating Value (PSTKL) [or Preferred Stock 
Redemption Value (PSTKRV), or Preferred Stock Par Value (PSTK)]; 
 R&D/Total Assets Ratio = R&D Expense (XRD)/Assets (AT); 
 Relative Dividend Premium = Value-weighted average Market/Book Ratio of dividend 
paying firms less the Market/Book Ratio of firm i; 
 Retained Earnings/Total Assets Ratio= Retained Earnings (RE) / Total Assets (AT);  





, where 𝑟𝑡 is the 
daily stock return of firm i, which is collected from CRSP with mnemonic RETX. 
 Shareholder Equity = Shareholders’ Equity (SEQ) [or Common Equity (CEQ) + Preferred 
Stock Par Value (PSTK) or Assets (AT) – Liabilities (LT)]; 
 Firm Size = the percentage of firms with smaller Market Equity at time t; 
Value of Stocks that are Bought Back = (Number of shares outstanding time t – Number of 
shares outstanding time t-1) * ((Share price time t + Share price time t-1)/2). Number of 
shares outstanding and share price are collected from CRSP with mnemonics 





Appendix 2. Derived CEO variables 
In this study, we derive CEO stock option values, deltas, and vegas twice: One for 
the 2006 through 2011 period, which is the main data set since it includes CEO inside debt 
and one for 1995 through 2008 period. For the 2006 through 2011 period, we derive CEO 
stock option values, deltas, and vegas separately for each tranche and aggregate them to find 
the sum of those of the CEO stock option portfolio. For the 1995 through 2012 period, we 
use Core and Guay’s (1999) approximation method (see footnote 7 for details). In our 
derivation we use the Black–Scholes (1973) option pricing model as modified by Merton 
(1973) following Core and Guay (1999) and Guay (1999).  
In this Appendix, we first present how we derive CEO stock option values, deltas, 
and vegas and then we define other variables. As before, we italicize the variables we derive 
and we provide Compustat Mnemonics in parentheses. 
The Black-Scholes model requires the following variables to estimate CEO stock 
option values and “greeks”: 
 𝑑 = natural logarithm of the expected dividend yield over the life of the option: 
ln(1 + (∑ 𝐷𝑡 ÷ 3
−1
𝑡=−3 )), where the dividend yield at year t is 𝐷𝑡 (DVYDF); 
 𝑟 = Risk-Free Rate: Ln (1 + 𝑅𝑓), where 𝑅𝑓 is Three-Month U.S. Treasury Bills which is 
obtained from the website of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (see footnote 10); 
 𝑆𝑡 = Stock Price at time t (PRCCF); 
 𝜎 = Expected Stock Return Volatility Over the Life of the Option: Annualized monthly 





) ∗ √12, where 





 𝑁 = Cumulative Probability Function for the Normal Distribution; 
 𝑁’ = Normal Density Function;  
 𝑇= Time Until the Maturity of the Option; 
 𝑋 = Strike Price (EXPRIC); 
 𝑍 = [ln (
𝑆
𝑋









=  𝑒−𝑑𝑡𝑁(𝑍) ∗ (𝑆/100); 




=  𝑒−𝑑𝑡𝑁′(𝑍)𝑆𝑇(1/2) ∗ (0.01). 
  We list the other CEO variables in alphabetical order as follows: 
 CEO Inside debt = Total Aggregate Balance in Deferred Compensation Plans at Fiscal 
Year (DEFER_BALANCE_TOT) + Present Value of Accumulated Pension Benefits 
from All Pension Plans (PENSION_VALUE_TOT); 
 CEO Unvested Stock Value = Stock Price (PRCCF) * Restricted Stock Holdings 
(STOCK_UNVEST_NUM); 
 CEO Common Stock Value = Stock Price (PRCCF) * Shares Owned 
(SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS); 
 CEO Equity Holdings = CEO Common Stock Value + CEO Unvested Stock Value + 
CEO Stock Options Value; 
 CEO Cash Compensation = Salary (SALARY) + Bonus (BONUS); 





 CEO Relative Leverage = CEO Leverage/[Debt/Equity]; 
 High CEO Relative Leverage is a dummy variable = one if CEO Relative Leverage > 
[Debt/Equity], and zero otherwise. 
Appendix 3. Variable definitions 
This appendix explains how we derive accounting and CEO variables. We start 
with the accounting variables. The italicized variables are those derived in this study. We 
obtain all accounting data from Compustat, and present mnemonics in parentheses.  
 Book equity: Shareholders’ equity − Preferred stock + deferred taxes and investment tax 
credit (TXDITC) + postretirement benefit asset (PRBA) 
 Book Leverage: Total assets (AT) −Book Equity all divided by total assets (AT) 
 Cash Surplus: Operating income (OANCF) + depreciation (DCP) + R&D expense (XRD) 
all scaled by total assets (AT) 
 Collateral Assets/Total Assets: Plant, property, and equipment (PPENT) scaled by total 
assets (AT)  
 Dividend Payer: {
1, (DVPSX)(𝑡) > 0
0, (DVPSX)(𝑡) = 0
 
 Dividend per Share: Dividend per Share by ExDate (DVPSX) 
 Dividend Yield: Dividend per Share by ExDate (DVPSX)/Stock Price (PRCCF); 
 Dividend Payout Ratio: (Dividend per Share by ExDate (DVPSX) * Shares Outstanding 
(CSHO)/Earnings Available for Common; 
 Free Cash flow:  [Operating income (OANCF) − Total Dividends (DV)]/Total assets (AT); 






 Market Equity: Common shares outstanding (CSHO) * stock price (PRCCF) 
 Market Leverage: Total assets (AT) − Book equity all divided by Market equity 
 Preferred Stock: First available of preferred stock liquidation value (PSTKL), preferred 
stock redemption value (PSTKRV), preferred stock (PSTK) 
 Shareholders’ Equity: First available of shareholders’ equity (SEQ), total assets (AT) − total 
liabilities (LT), common stock (CEQ) + preferred stock (PSTKL) 
 Log(Sale): Natural log of sales (SALE) 
Next, we derive the CEO variables. We obtain all CEO variables from Execucomp. 
In addition, we use data from the Federal Reserve’s (Fed) website 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm), Compustat, and CRSP, since CEO 
stock option calculation requires yearly dividend payout information, stock prices, and the 
three-month Treasury bill as the risk-free rate. Dividend payout ratio is calculated as 
presented under the accounting data calculation in this Appendix, Stock prices are obtained 
from CRSP, and the risk-free rate is from the Fed.  
 CEO Age: (AGE) 
 CEO Portfolio Delta: Restricted Share Delta + Stock Holding Delta + Stock Option Delta 
 CEO Portfolio Vega: Restricted Share Vega + Stock Holding Vega + Stock Option Vega 
 CEO Restricted Stock Delta: Restricted Stock Holdings (STOCK_UNVEST_NUM) * 
Stock Price (PRCCF)/100 
 CEO Restricted Stock Vega: Restricted Stock Holdings (STOCK_UNVEST_NUM) * 
Stock Return Volatility * 0.01 






 CEO Stock Holding Vega: Shares Owned (SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS) * Stock Return 
Volatility * 0.01 




) ∗ (0.01) respectively, where 𝑍 = [ln (
𝑆
𝑋
) + 𝑇 (𝑟 − 𝑑 +
𝜎2
2
)] /𝜎𝑇(1/2), 𝑋 
is strike price, 𝑆 is price of the stock (PRCCF), 𝜎 is expected stock-return volatility over the 
life of the option, 𝑟 is the risk-free rate, 𝑑 is natural logarithm of the expected dividend yield 
over the life of the option, 𝑇 is the time until the maturity of the option, 𝑁 is cumulative 
probability function for the normal distribution, and 𝑁’ is normal density function. Stock 
option values and “greeks” are calculated for each trance separately and aggregated to find 
the total values, deltas, and vegas.  






Figure 1. Consumer sentiment and dividend premium 
This figure presents the consumer sentiment (dashed-line) and dividend premium (solid line). Consumer 
sentiment is scaled by the right axis and dividend premium is scaled by the left axis. Positive (negative) dividend 






















1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010







Figure 2. Percentage of initiating and omitting firms 
This table presents the percentage of firms that initiated (dashed-line) and omitted (solid line) dividends. 
Percentage of initiating firms is calculated by dividing the number of initiating firms at time t by the number of 
non-payers at time t-1 which were still listed at time t. Percentage of omitting firms is calculated by dividing the 





































































































































Percentage of firms that initiate and omit dividends






Table 1. Sample distribution: 1996-2008 vs. 2006-2011 
This table presents the sample distribution by year and industry. Panel A shows the breakdown of the sample 
observations by year and Panel B by two–digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry codes. 
 Main  Robustness  
 2006-2011 1995-2008 
YEAR N % N % 
1996 - - 219 5.62% 
1997 - - 228 5.85% 
1998 - - 240 6.16% 
1999 - - 270 6.93% 
2000 - - 290 7.45% 
2001 - - 304 7.80% 
2002 - - 316 8.11% 
2003 - - 313 8.04% 
2004 - - 315 8.09% 
2005 - - 303 7.78% 
2006 246 11.62 299 7.68% 
2007 377 17.81 366 9.40% 
2008 393 18.56 432 11.09% 
2009 401 18.94 - - 
2010 376 17.76 - - 
2011 324 15.30 - - 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5. Robustness test: Inside debt and non-linearity 
This table presents the results of the logistic regression in which the dependent variable equals one if the firm 
pays dividends at time t, and zero otherwise. Presented in parentheses is the square root of the Wald statistic, 
which is analogous to the t–value. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. Company and CEO variable definitions are explained in detail in Appendix 1 and 2, respectively. 
Models (3) and (9) are estimated with 834 observations and all the others with 2117 observations. All models 
include industry and year dummies.  
Dependent variable: Equals one if the firm pays dividends at time t, and zero otherwise 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CEO Cash Comp. ($millions)   0.2222 0.221 
   (1.201) (1.2207) 
MID CEO Inside Debt  ($millions) 0.9441***  0.615***  
 (6.1466)  (3.1892)  
HIGH CEO Inside Debt ($millions) 1.0094***  0.4695**  
 (6.1008)  (2.1432)  
MID Log of CEO relative lev. dummy  0.747***  0.4086** 
  (4.903)  (2.1729) 
HIGH Log of CEO relative lev. dummy  1.491***  0.7*** 
  (9.072)  (3.3512) 
CEO Delta/Vega Ratio   0.0199*** 0.02*** 
   (6.1755) (6.2511) 
CEO Equity ($ million)   0.0008 0.0015 
   (0.4636) (0.8149) 
CEO Vega ($ thousand)   -0.0384*** -0.0378*** 
   (-9.5152) (-9.3535) 
CEO Age 0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0062 -0.0064 
 (0.0988) (-0.0553) (-0.6088) (-0.6332) 
Log of Tenure 0.1339 0.1933** 0.4948*** 0.5175*** 
 (1.5989) (2.2997) (4.8051) (5.095) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.0776*** -0.0806*** -0.0114 -0.0137 
 (-4.5435) (-4.6337) (-0.5785) (-0.6906) 
R&D Missing Dummy 0.4881*** 0.5482*** 0.4224** 0.4438*** 
 (3.458) (3.8296) (2.5016) (2.6123) 
Capex/Total Assets -0.0179 -0.0169 -0.0209 -0.0226 
 (-1.5045) (-1.4305) (-1.4598) (-1.5832) 
Change in Assets (%) -1.7864*** -1.6869*** -1.5538*** -1.5013*** 
 (-4.8592) (-4.5607) (-3.5624) (-3.4472) 
Market/Book 0.1322** 0.0818 0.0197 -0.0077 
 (2.281) (1.3898) (0.2554) (-0.0997) 
Profitability ($ thousand) 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004 0.0003 
 (0.1246) (0.1097) (0.2935) (0.2238) 
Size -0.0005 0.0013 0.0067* 0.007* 
 (-0.157) (0.4114) (1.6629) (1.7476) 
Retained Earnings/Total Assets 1.7007*** 1.5822*** 1.532*** 1.4867*** 
 (9.6949) (9.0336) (7.4157) (7.2169) 
Return Volatility -0.2697*** -0.2269*** -0.2613*** -0.244*** 
 (-4.0231) (-3.4032) (-3.3869) (-3.1743) 
Intercept -0.8889 -1.0249* -1.1331 -1.1516* 






Table 6. Robustness test: A Robustness test for endogeneity bias in the 2006 though 2011 
period 
This table presents the results of a robustness test checking for endogeneity bias using logistic regressions, 
where the dependent variable equals one if the firm pays dividends at time t and zero otherwise. Following 
Shen and Zhang (2012), we deconstruct CEO compensation variables into their “expected” and “excess” 
components. We estimate all regression models using industry (two-digit SIC codes) and year dummy 
variables. The square root of the Wald statistic, which is analogous to the t-value, is reported in parentheses. 
The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Company and CEO 
variable definitions are explained in detail in Appendix 1 and 2, respectively. All models are estimated using 
1781 observations. 
Dependent variable: Equals one if the firm pays dividends at time t, and zero otherwise 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CEO Excess Cash Compensation 0.039     -0.254 
 (0.3317)     (-1.2554) 
CEO Excess Delta/Vega Ratio  -0.0003    -0.0003 
  (-0.5867)    (-0.874) 
CEO Excess Inside Debt   0.0417*   0.1338** 
   (1.717)   (2.5423) 
CEO Excess Equity    -0.0064***  0.0053*** 
    (-3.5544)  (2.7332) 
CEO Excess Vega     -0.0446*** -0.0477*** 
     (-13.0908) (-12.9304) 
CEO Age -0.0131 -0.0128 -0.0129 -0.0109 0.0029 0.0012 
 (-1.4342) (-1.4068) (-1.4159) (-1.1762) (0.2656) (0.1118) 
Capex/Total Assets -0.0218* -0.0218* -0.0209 -0.0165 0.0027 -0.0005 
 (-1.6518) (-1.6513) (-1.5876) (-1.2442) (0.1862) (-0.0347) 
Log of Tenure 0.3775*** 0.3763*** 0.3714*** 0.3692*** 0.1121 0.1167 
 (3.9161) (3.9063) (3.8563) (3.7907) (1.0048) (1.0407) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.1007*** -0.1003*** -0.099*** -0.0957*** -0.0259 -0.025 
 (-5.3696) (-5.3532) (-5.283) (-5.0772) (-1.2619) (-1.1994) 
R&D Missing Dummy 0.4508*** 0.4525*** 0.4615*** 0.4787*** 0.3402* 0.3294* 
 (2.7904) (2.8007) (2.8555) (2.9435) (1.8894) (1.8146) 
Change in Assets (%) -1.7681*** -1.771*** -1.7817*** -1.7852*** -1.6225*** -1.5952*** 
 (-4.3546) (-4.3624) (-4.3841) (-4.347) (-3.4077) (-3.3654) 
Market/Book 0.2482*** 0.2495*** 0.2517*** 0.2397*** -0.0252 -0.018 
 (3.8275) (3.8496) (3.8826) (3.6059) (-0.3056) (-0.223) 
Profitability ($ thousand) 0.0033* 0.0033* 0.0035** 0.0038** 0.0043** 0.0041** 
 (1.9367) (1.9493) (2.0018) (2.1762) (2.1244) (1.9932) 
Size -0.0036 -0.0037 -0.004 -0.0031 -0.0021 -0.0035 
 (-0.9732) (-0.9871) (-1.0853) (-0.8291) (-0.4893) (-0.7993) 
Retained Earnings/Total Assets 1.9203*** 1.9194*** 1.937*** 1.9324*** 1.5926*** 1.5678*** 
 (9.6089) (9.6027) (9.6481) (9.6316) (7.2213) (7.003) 
Return volatility -0.2205*** -0.2198*** -0.2152*** -0.2063*** -0.2703*** -0.2749*** 
 (-2.9479) (-2.9416) (-2.8738) (-2.7489) (-3.2076) (-3.2301) 
Intercept -0.6102 -0.6343 -0.6315 -0.8686 -1.1922* -1.0888 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11. Robustness test: Propensity to pay in the 1996 though 2008 period 
This table presents the results of the logistic regression in which the dependent variable equals one if the firm 
pays dividends at time t and zero otherwise. Presented in parentheses is the square root of the Wald statistic, 
which is analogous to the t-value. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. Company and CEO variable definitions are explained in detail in Appendix 1 and 2, respectively. 
All models are estimated with 3895 observations. All models include industry and year dummies.  
Dependent variable: Equals one if the firm pays dividends at time t, and zero otherwise 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Cash Comp. ($ million) 0.0624    0.2375** 
 (0.7413)    (2.3337) 
CEO Delta/Vega Ratio  0.0018**   0 
  (2.1082)   (0.1389) 
CEO Equity ($ million)   -0.0031***  0.0032*** 
   (-4.326)  (3.7312) 
CEO Vega ($ thousand)    -0.0303*** -0.0338*** 
    (-14.167) (-13.7357) 
CEO Age 0.0097* 0.0095* 0.0136** 0.0097 0.0055 
 (1.7846) (1.745) (2.4724) (1.6424) (0.9196) 
Log of Tenure 0.1723** 0.1723** 0.2045*** 0.3437*** 0.319*** 
 (2.5101) (2.5113) (2.9657) (4.6636) (4.3101) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.1162*** -0.1141*** -0.1178*** -0.1182*** -0.1153*** 
 (-7.76) (-7.6124) (-7.8145) (-7.3004) (-7.1217) 
R&D Missing Dummy -0.1607 -0.167 -0.1476 -0.1651 -0.1751 
 (-1.3218) (-1.3731) (-1.2114) (-1.2782) (-1.3495) 
Capex/Total Assets -0.0156** -0.0149* -0.0154** -0.0106 -0.0093 
 (-2.0283) (-1.9345) (-1.9957) (-1.3173) (-1.1614) 
Change in Assets (%) -0.0744 -0.0687 -0.0789 -0.0642 -0.0585 
 (-0.8524) (-0.7856) (-0.8944) (-0.7038) (-0.6408) 
Market/Book -0.2152*** -0.2188*** -0.194*** -0.1733*** -0.1752*** 
 (-5.1271) (-5.2409) (-4.5756) (-3.9467) (-3.9568) 
Profitability ($ thousand) 0.0078*** 0.0078*** 0.0078*** 0.0093*** 0.009*** 
 (5.9659) (6.0211) (6.0104) (6.5294) (6.3577) 
Size -0.0024 -0.0025 -0.0007 0.0036 0.0012 
 (-0.9275) (-0.9773) (-0.2888) (1.3253) (0.4323) 
Retained Earnings/Total Assets 3.2568*** 3.1804*** 3.2855*** 3.0832*** 3.0602*** 
 (17.6024) (17.0881) (17.7564) (15.7749) (15.4624) 
Return Volatility -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-0.5649) (-0.5457) (-0.5797) (-0.1542) (-0.177) 
Intercept -0.754** -0.7629** -1.0325*** -0.7485** -0.562 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 13. Sample distribution omitting and initiating firms 
This table shows the sample distribution by years. Payers and non-payers are the firms that paid and not paid 
dividends at time t. Initiating firms are the ones that did not pay dividends for at least 36 months and kept 
paying dividends for 36 months after the initiation month. Similarly, omitting firms are the ones that paid 
dividends for at least 36 months prior to the omission month and did not start paying dividends for 36 months 
after the omission month. Surviving non-payers are the firms that did not pay dividends at time t-1 and are still 
listed at time t. Surviving non-payers are the firms that did not pay dividends at time t-1 and still listed at time t. 
Percentage of initiating firms is calculated by dividing the number of initiating firms by the number of surviving 
non-payers. Percentage of omitting firms is calculated by dividing the number of omitting firms by the number 
of surviving payers.  






















1980 3576 2056 1520 4 15 2060 1164 0.34 0.73 
1981 3980 1944 2036 10 18 1944 1418 0.71 0.93 
1982 3829 1821 2008 3 25 1839 1748 0.17 1.36 
1983 4373 1739 2634 5 9 1745 1919 0.26 0.52 
1984 4482 1693 2789 11 6 1624 2332 0.47 0.37 
1985 4383 1582 2801 4 9 1577 2434 0.16 0.57 
1986 4469 1445 3024 4 15 1458 2414 0.17 1.03 
1987 4428 1389 3039 10 13 1326 2567 0.39 0.98 
1988 4427 1332 3095 9 6 1276 2820 0.32 0.47 
1989 4252 1299 2953 14 7 1258 2707 0.52 0.56 
1990 4153 1263 2890 12 10 1243 2606 0.46 0.8 
1991 4214 1206 3008 10 14 1242 2586 0.39 1.13 
1992 4348 1258 3090 10 13 1193 2655 0.38 1.09 
1993 4788 1258 3530 11 14 1232 2916 0.38 1.14 
1994 5088 1281 3807 11 10 1234 3249 0.34 0.81 
1995 5235 1292 3943 17 15 1236 3443 0.49 1.21 
1996 5660 1247 4413 11 7 1232 3602 0.31 0.57 
1997 5689 1205 4484 8 4 1175 3924 0.2 0.34 
1998 5237 1148 4089 4 6 1138 3748 0.11 0.53 
1999 4763 1069 3694 5 14 1050 3281 0.15 1.33 
2000 4222 945 3277 1 9 973 2876 0.03 0.92 
2001 4169 863 3306 3 8 888 3054 0.1 0.9 
2002 3949 802 3147 9 4 824 2992 0.3 0.49 
2003 3684 907 2777 60 4 781 2798 2.14 0.51 
2004 3657 973 2684 33 2 882 2561 1.29 0.23 
2005 3619 997 2622 24 4 922 2494 0.96 0.43 
2006 3568 983 2585 16 2 946 2415 0.66 0.21 
2007 3457 954 2503 11 2 904 2313 0.48 0.22 
2008 2850 852 1998 5 0 844 1919 0.26 0 
2009 3098 815 2283 8 7 897 2097 0.38 0.78 







Table 14. Descriptive statistics: Returns after dividend initiations and omissions 
Panel B of this table reports the descriptive statistics (i.e., number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 
and minimum and maximum values) of stock returns before and after dividend initiations and omissions. The 
pre-event period is the 36-month period before the policy change. The post-event period consists of the event 
month as well as the 36-month period subsequent to the event, which consists of 37 monthly observations per 
event. Taken together, our sample includes 73 observation for each event. The first (second) row in both panels 




 Initiations Omissions 
 N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max 
Pre 12960 2.0286 12.3557 -40.4153 62.1622 9648 -0.4228 11.2312 -48.7634 58.1871 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 17. Auxiliary cash flow statements of dividend omitting firms 
This table reports the simplified cash flow statements of selected firms at the omission year, as well as one year before 
and after the omission year. All values are hand-collected from firms’ 10Ks. We derive the Cash from other Financing 
Activities as Cash from Financing Activities − Total Dividends Paid. All values are in thousand dollars. Values in 
parentheses indicate negative cash flow. 
Firm name Year Total  
dividends 
paid 






Arctic Cat Inc. 2011 - (946) (11,674) (5,123) 
2010 - 221 (6,540) 29,315 
2009 (3,796) 0 (14,226) 19,591 
Carmike Cinemas 2010 - (27,457) (12,858) 27,685 
2009 - (24,515) (10,509) 49,853 
2008 (6,732) (30,052) 604 25,072 
Pier 1 Imports 2009 - 2,161 91,838 (31,634) 
2008 - 2,911 6,418 (83,074) 
2007 (17,398) 4,436 31,830 (104,905) 
Furniture Brands Int’l., 
Inc. 
2010 - (18,000) (19,151) 5,301 
2009 - (95,000) (5,297) 77,599 
2008 (5,844) (110,800) 43,086 41,382 
Tempur-Pedic 
International 
2010 - (106,376) (37,517) 184,122 
2009 - (118,721) (14,303) 134,986 
2008 (17,993) (182,217) (5,368) 198,394 
Wabash National 
Corp. 
2010 - 50,752 31 (30,691)
60
 
2009 - (20,963) (681) (7,014) 
2008 (5,510) (24,214) (12,400) 30,671 
Winnebago Industries 
Inc. 
2011 - 500 4,235 (10,119)
61
 
2010 - (9,248) 14,334 33,039 
2009 (3,489) 1,968 4,986 8,272 
                                                 
60
 Invested $59,062,000 in inventories, because orders increased for the next year. 
61















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 21. CEO risk preferences, firm distress, and the propensity to pay dividends  
This table reports the results of five logistics regressions to determine the effect of managerial risk preferences on the 
propensity to pay dividends when the firm is in financial distress. In these regressions, the dependent variable is 1.0 if 
the firm pays dividends at time t, and 0.0 otherwise. Distressed Firm is a binary variable, which is 1 if the firm’s Z-Score 
is less than 1.8, and 0 otherwise. Distressed Firm*CEO Equity, Distressed Firm*High CEO Relative Leverage, and 
Distressed Firm*CEO Vega/Delta are interaction variables. They capture the propensity to pay dividends of CEOs with 
high equity compensation, relative leverage (i.e., inside debt), or vega/delta ratio in distressed firms. Numbers in 
parentheses are t-values. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Variable 
definitions are explained in the Appendix 3.  
Dependent variable: Equals one if the firm pays dividends at time t, and zero otherwise. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Distressed Firm*CEO Equity -0.0209   -0.0418  
 (-0.8071)   (-1.4907)  
Distressed Firm*CEO Vega/Delta  -6.0449***  -6.0725*** -5.5216*** 
  (-3.7802)  (-3.7971) (-3.5213) 
Distressed Firm*High CEO Relative Leverage    2.4629*** 1.2618 1.7098** 
   (3.1685) (1.3977) (1.982) 
Distressed Firm -1.3037*** 0.1445 -1.658*** 0.4624 -0.0974 
 (-4.3642) (0.3902) (-6.3674) (0.9433) (-0.2467) 
CEO Age 0.0163** 0.0168** 0.0162** 0.0165** 0.0166** 
 (2.2215) (2.2831) (2.2002) (2.228) (2.2534) 
Log(CEO Tenure) 0.3381*** 0.3417*** 0.3363*** 0.3445*** 0.3406*** 
 (4.4437) (4.4967) (4.4063) (4.5222) (4.4722) 
Capex/Total Assets Ratio -3.1604*** -3.2473*** -3.1764*** -3.2221*** -3.2389*** 
 (-2.9038) (-2.9946) (-2.9178) (-2.9448) (-2.9812) 
R&D/Total Assets Ratio -11.9783*** -11.9963*** -11.9454*** -11.8285*** -11.9031*** 
 (-8.1949) (-8.1728) (-8.1721) (-8.0389) (-8.1068) 
R&D Missing Binary 0.2226* 0.2283* 0.2328* 0.2337* 0.2403* 
 (1.645) (1.6823) (1.7163) (1.7163) (1.7668) 
Change in Assets (%) -0.0814 -0.082 -0.0826 -0.0883 -0.0833 
 (-0.8812) (-0.8809) (-0.8901) (-0.9424) (-0.8926) 
Market/Book Ratio -0.1217** -0.1138** -0.1171** -0.1158** -0.1128** 
 (-2.2691) (-2.1191) (-2.1832) (-2.1535) (-2.0995) 
Profitability ($ million) 1.4333*** 1.3461*** 1.398*** 1.3453*** 1.3281*** 
 (2.8367) (2.6301) (2.7488) (2.6134) (2.5874) 
Firm Size 0.0142*** 0.0139*** 0.0141*** 0.0142*** 0.014*** 
 (5.8786) (5.7597) (5.8368) (5.8369) (5.7759) 
Intercept -2.2299*** -2.2584*** -2.21*** -2.2459*** -2.2459*** 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 23. CEO risk preferences, free cash flow, and firm financial stability  
This table reports the results of five logistics regressions. In these models, the dependent variable is 1.0 if the 
firm is financially stable (i.e., Z-Score is equal or above 3.0) at time t, and 0.0 otherwise. FCF*CEO Equity, 
FCF*High CEO Relative Leverage, and FCF*CEO Vega/Delta Ratio are interaction variables. They capture 
how CEOs with high equity compensation, relative leverage (i.e., inside debt), or vega/delta ratio affect the 
firm’s financial stability in firms with high free cash flow. The numbers in parentheses are t-values. The 
superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Variable definitions are 
explained in the Appendix 3.  
Dependent variable: Equals one if the firm is financially stable at time t, and zero otherwise. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Free Cash flow ($ million) (FCF) 1.4308** 1.4396** 1.518** 0.9634 1.0256 
 (2.3061) (2.277) (2.4274) (1.542) (1.5949) 
FCF*CEO Equity  -0.0004   0.0008 
  (-0.0728)   (0.1547) 
FCF*CEO Vega/Delta   -0.137***  -0.1268*** 
   (-5.5063)  (-4.957) 
FCF*High CEO Relative Leverage    8.048*** 8.0376*** 
    (3.613) (3.5975) 
CEO Age 0.0101 0.0101 0.0099 0.008 0.0078 
 (1.2774) (1.2763) (1.2573) (1.0063) (0.9901) 
Log(Tenure) -0.0418 -0.0415 -0.0426 -0.0599 -0.0614 
 (-0.5369) (-0.532) (-0.5473) (-0.7668) (-0.7838) 
Capex/Total Assets Ratio 0.3055 0.3053 0.2714 0.338 0.3056 
 (0.2575) (0.2574) (0.2287) (0.2852) (0.2577) 
R&D/Total Assets Ratio -1.9998** -1.996** -2.0247** -1.9004** -1.9317** 
 (-2.3553) (-2.3464) (-2.3867) (-2.2429) (-2.2776) 
R&D Missing Dummy -0.1673 -0.1674 -0.1683 -0.1186 -0.1194 
 (-1.1583) (-1.159) (-1.1655) (-0.8137) (-0.819) 
Profitability ($ million) 5.0362*** 5.0391*** 5.033*** 5.1479*** 5.1374*** 
 (9.2681) (9.2489) (9.2652) (9.3851) (9.3468) 
Firm Size 0.0319*** 0.0319*** 0.0318*** 0.0316*** 0.0315*** 
 (13.8226) (13.8226) (13.7973) (13.6125) (13.577) 
Intercept -1.2542*** -1.2541*** -1.2431*** -1.1159** -1.1058** 
















Strome College of Business, Finance Department, Constant Hall 2056 
757-286-5196 • mcaliska@odu.edu • www.deren.us 
 
EDUCATION 
Ph.D. in Finance, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA, 2015   
Outstanding Doctoral Student in Finance 
M.A. in Economics, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA, 2015   
M.B.A., Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA, 2008  
B.B.A., Istanbul University, Istanbul, Turkey, 2005  
PUBLICATIONS 
 “Stock returns and the price of gold” (with Mohammad Najand), Journal of Asset 
Management, forthcoming  
PRESENTATIONS & WORKSHOPS 
External 
Southwestern Finance Association Conference, Houston, TX, “Stock returns and the price 
of gold,” 2015 
Internal 
Invited to host a training workshop on CRSP and Compustat for the Finance Department, 
Old Dominion University, 2015 
Old Dominion University Dean’s Research Seminar, “CEO risk preferences and dividend 
policy decision,” 2015 
Invited to host a training workshop on SAS for the Doctoral Student Association, Old 
Dominion University, 2013 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
Adjunct faculty at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA, 2011-2015 
Managerial economics (4.18/5)  
Intro corporate finance (4.6/5)  
Principles of macroeconomics (4.5/5)  
Principles of microeconomics (4.22/5)  
Teaching assistant at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA, 2007-2008 
International finance, MBA 
Accounting for managers, MBA 
SERVICE 
Session chair and discussant at the Southwestern Finance Association Conference, 2015 
Referee for the Financial Management Association Venice Conference, 2015 
SCHOLARSHIPS 
Earned full scholarship for the Ph.D. program in Finance, Old Dominion University, 2008  
Earned summer grant in the MBA program, Old Dominion University, 2008  
Earned Graduate Assistantship for the MBA program, Old Dominion University, 2006 
 
